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77 
THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS’S THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER AFTER 
CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES 
JENNIFER MASON MCAWARD

 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress power ―to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖ In Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., the Supreme Court held that Section 2 permits Congress to 
define the ―badges and incidents of slavery‖ and pass ―all laws necessary 
and proper‖ for their abolition. Congress has passed a number of civil 
rights laws under this understanding of its Section 2 power. Several 
commentators have urged Congress to define the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery‖ expansively and to use Section 2 to address everything from 
racial profiling to discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual 
orientation.  
Jones, however, is in serious tension with City of Boerne v. Flores, 
which held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s virtually identical 
enforcement language permits only prophylactic legislation that is 
congruent and proportional to violations of judicially determined rights. 
Even more critically, Jones’s grant to Congress of substantive interpretive 
power runs afoul of the principles of separation of powers, judicial 
supremacy, and federalism that drove the Court in City of Boerne. Thus, 
the time is ripe to reconsider Jones and the proper scope of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. This Article does precisely 
that, delving into the text, history, and structural implications of Section 2. 
Ultimately, this Article considers three ways to approach Section 2: as 
a limited power to prevent and remedy coerced labor; as a broad power to 
define the badges and incidents of slavery and to protect a wide array of 
civil rights; and as a prophylactic power to prevent the de facto 
reemergence of slavery by addressing the historical incidents and badges 
of the slave system. This Article concludes that the prophylactic reading of 
Section 2 best comports with both the original meaning of the provision 
and the structural principles of separation of powers, judicial supremacy, 
and federalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the Supreme Court has tightened its review of legislation passed 
pursuant to Congress‘s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, 
many commentators have turned to the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
panacea—a source of congressional power for enhanced civil rights 
protections. Hailed as a ―means for enforcing [the nation‘s] foundational 
principles of liberty and general wellbeing,‖1 and yet lamented as 
 
 
 1. Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 
45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 309 (2004). 
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―missing‖ from constitutional dialogue,2 the Thirteenth Amendment 
declares that ―[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.‖3 
Section 2 of the Amendment gives Congress the power ―to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.‖4  
Congress has relied on its Section 2 power in passing a number of 
statutes, from the Civil Rights Act of 1866
5
 and the Anti-Peonage Act of 
1867,
6
 to the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
7
 the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Prevention Act of 2000,
8
 and, most recently, the Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.
9
 Some of these 
statutes seek to enforce the literal terms of Section 1 of the Amendment by 
protecting individuals from involuntary servitude.
10
 Others are civil rights 
bills that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, and, in some instances, religion.
11
  
Few have questioned whether Section 2 in fact empowers Congress to 
pass such civil rights laws. On the contrary, Congress and academics have 
assumed, with justification, that the Section 2 power is expansive. In 1968, 
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court rejected a Thirteenth 
Amendment challenge to the portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that 
prohibits racial discrimination in property conveyances.
12
 In Jones, the 
Court stated that Section 2 gives Congress ―the power . . . rationally to 
 
 
 2. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendment: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 4. Id. § 2. 
 5. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2006)). 
 6. See Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 
(2006) (criminal provision); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (civil provision)). 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1594 (2006). 
 9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701–
4713, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–44 (2009). Division E of the Act is denominated as the Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. The Thirteenth Amendment portion of the Act 
imposes significant penalties on anyone ―whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully 
causes bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or 
national origin of [that] person.‖ Id. § 4707. Other portions of the bill, justified under the Commerce 
Clause, would extend protection against hate crimes motivated by gender, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (Anti-Peonage Act). 
 11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2006) (portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
prohibiting race discrimination in the exercise of contract and property rights); id. § 3604 (portion of 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or 
religion); 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006) (prohibiting the use of force against a person using a public 
program or facility on the basis of the person‘s race, color, national origin, or religion). 
 12. 392 U.S. 409, 437–43 (1968). 
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determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the 
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.‖13 Jones 
thus carved out a broad range of discretion for Congress in enforcing the 
Thirteenth Amendment and set forth a very deferential standard of judicial 
review with respect to enforcement measures. 
Jones was the third in a trio of Warren Court decisions in which the 
Court took a consistently broad view of Congress‘s power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
contain enforcement clauses very similar to that of the Thirteenth: each 
gives Congress the ―power to enforce‖ its substantive provisions by 
―appropriate legislation.‖14 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach15 and 
Katzenbach v. Morgan,
16
 the Court considered the scope of Congress‘s 
Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, respectively. 
In each case, the Court held that Congress‘s power was akin to that 
conferred by the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that McCulloch v. 
Maryland provided the basic test for measuring the propriety of 
congressional enactments.
17
 Thus, ―all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to [a ‗legitimate‘] end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.‖18 
Jones similarly invoked McCulloch, giving Congress wide-ranging 
discretion, not only to determine what means are appropriate to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment, but arguably also to define for itself the 
substantive ends of the Amendment, i.e., the badges and incidents of 
slavery.  
In recent years, however, the Court has altered its approach to 
enforcement legislation and shown itself far less willing to defer to 
Congress. In City of Boerne v. Flores,
19
 the Court articulated new limits on 
the scope of Congress‘s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Any statute purporting to be an exercise of that power must 
be ―congruen[t] and proportiona[l]‖ to judicially identified violations of 
the rights articulated in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20
 Using 
 
 
 13. Id. at 440. 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress ―power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article‖); id. amend. XV, § 2 (giving Congress ―power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation‖). 
 15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 17. See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650. 
 18. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 20. Id. at 520.  
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this new standard, the Court has held that Congress exceeded its Section 5 
power in passing several civil rights laws.
21
 Recently, at least one member 
of the Court has suggested that the City of Boerne standard should apply in 
the Fifteenth Amendment voting rights context as well.
22
 City of Boerne 
thus offers a substantially more restrictive standard for evaluating 
congressional action than Jones, despite the similar text of Sections 5 and 
2. 
In light of City of Boerne, Jones is arguably a remnant of the past. 
However, the Court itself has never explicitly questioned the Jones 
standard, and lower courts continue to invoke that standard to evaluate 
Thirteenth Amendment legislation.
23
 Recent academic literature has 
suggested that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would empower 
Congress to pass legislation regarding everything from hate speech, to 
racial profiling, to abortion rights and gay rights.
24
 Some have noted the 
 
 
 21. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women 
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 22. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2524–25 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that the City of 
Boerne ―congruence and proportionality‖ standard should apply in evaluating the Voting Rights Act). 
This case involved the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A three-judge panel 
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the rational basis standard articulated 
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), rather than the elevated ―congruence and 
proportionality‖ standard of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), should apply. See Nw. 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008). A majority of the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between the two standards but declined to resolve it. See 
129 S. Ct. at 2512–13 (noting the parties‘ disagreement whether ―congruence and proportionality‖ or 
―rational[ity]‖ should be ―the standard to apply in deciding whether . . . Congress exceeded its 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power‖).  
 23. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 87–88 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding the Fair Housing 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601–3619 to be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery); United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that acts of violence prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) imposed a badge 
or incident of involuntary servitude on their victims and thus could be prohibited under the Thirteenth 
Amendment); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), 
prohibiting violent interference with enjoyment of a public facility, could be applied to religious and/or 
racial attacks against Jews as a valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment); United States v. Nicholson, 185 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that 18 
U.S.C. § 241, the civil rights conspiracy statute, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, the criminal provision of the 
Fair Housing Act, are valid exercises of the Thirteenth Amendment‘s enforcement power). 
 24. See Amar, supra note 2, at 158 (1992) (arguing that racial hate speech is a badge of 
servitude); Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401 (2000) 
(arguing that laws that control women‘s reproductive rights are vestiges of the institution of slavery 
and manifestations of modern slavery); William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework 
for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004) (analyzing racial profiling as a 
badge or incident of slavery); David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of ―Jim Crow‖: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133 (1994) 
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tension between Jones and City of Boerne,
25
 but few have taken seriously 
the possibility that Jones‘s viability might be in question.26 To date, 
nobody has undertaken a comprehensive review of the Jones standard on 
its own merits, much less with an eye toward how the Court‘s approach in 
City of Boerne might affect its view of Congress‘s efforts under Section 2. 
This Article attempts to fill that gap by examining the proper scope of 
Congress‘s Section 2 enforcement power from the perspectives of 
constitutional text, history, and structure, and by considering how the 
structural concerns that motivated the Court in City of Boerne might play 
out in the Section 2 context. 
Part I of this Article begins by providing some background on 
Congress‘s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. Parts I.A 
and I.B note the language of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments‘ enforcement clauses and describe some statutes passed 
pursuant to Congress‘s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Parts 
I.C and I.D then trace how the federal judiciary has analyzed 
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement legislation, contrasting the 
Warren Court‘s approach with that of the modern Court in City of Boerne. 
Part II focuses on Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and attempts 
to flesh out the background information necessary to assess the proper 
scope of Congress‘s power under that Section. Part II.A explores the 
original meaning of Section 2 with reference to three legislative debates. 
The debates surrounding the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the first statute passed by 
Congress pursuant to its Section 2 power), and the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (which was proposed, in part, to resolve doubts 
about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866) provide a 
 
 
(arguing that Colorado law prohibiting protections for gays is a badge or incident of modern slavery); 
Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389 (2004) (proposing a 
Thirteenth Amendment framework for regulating hate speech); see also Alexander Tsesis, A Civil 
Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1836–37 (2006) (arguing that Section 2 allows Congress to legislate regarding 
any conduct that ―interfere[s] with fundamental rights . . . [or] the ideals of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Preamble‖).  
 25. Those who have noted the tension use Jones as evidence that City of Boerne was wrongly 
decided. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 822–23 (1999); Evan H. 
Caminker, ―Appropriate‖ Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 
(2001); Lawrence G. Sager, Commentary, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing 
Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (2000). 
 26. See William M. Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: 
―Congruence and Proportionality‖ or ―Necessary and Proper‖?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973 (2007) 
(examining structural and pragmatic reasons why Jones should continue to stand after City of Boerne); 
cf. Tsesis, supra note 24 (assuming that Jones will continue to stand after City of Boerne). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/2
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multiplicity of perspectives on both the substantive coverage of Section 1 
of the Amendment and the scope of Congress‘s Section 2 enforcement 
power. Part II.B examines the federal courts‘ historic approach to 
Congress‘s Section 2 power. Part II.C explores the ―badges and incidents 
of slavery,‖ a central concept in defining the outer limits of the Section 2 
power. 
Part III offers three different approaches to Congress‘s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power and evaluates each from the perspectives 
of text, history, and constitutional structure. Part III.A evaluates the most 
restrictive view: that Section 2 limits Congress solely to enacting statutes 
directed at preventing or punishing efforts to hold a person in slavery or 
involuntary servitude. In other words, the Section 2 enforcement power is 
limited to the literal terms of Section 1. This view is arguably supported 
by a strict reading of the Amendment‘s text, as well as some framers‘ 
views of the scope of the Section 2 power. Moreover, this view sets clear 
lines for separation-of-powers purposes: it respects judicial supremacy and 
sets boundaries for Congress‘s enforcement efforts. If this view of Section 
2 prevails, Jones was wrongly decided, and virtually all civil-rights-related 
Thirteenth Amendment legislation would fall, as statutes forbidding 
discrimination on the basis of race or anything else go well beyond the 
realm of slavery and involuntary servitude. 
Part III.B considers the most expansive view of Congress‘s Section 2 
power, namely, that offered by Jones and accepted by most modern 
Thirteenth Amendment scholars: that Congress can enforce Section 1 by 
first defining the badges and incidents of slavery, and then legislating to 
address them. Under this view, the federal courts will review Congress‘s 
findings as to both substance and remedy solely for rationality. This 
approach imbues Congress with wide-ranging discretion to decide, not 
only the permissible means by which to effectuate the Amendment‘s 
promise, but also the substantive ends to which the Amendment is 
addressed. Section 2, viewed in this light, arguably would empower 
Congress to pass wide-ranging civil rights laws that protect classes and 
target conduct far removed from the historical practice of slavery. 
Although it is possible to argue that placing substantive definitional power 
in Congress‘s hands is uniquely appropriate in the Thirteenth Amendment 
context, this approach raises red flags with respect to federalism, as well as 
the separation of powers, particularly as interpreted by City of Boerne. 
Thus, it likely goes further than the modern Court would or should be 
willing to go. 
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Part III.C posits the middle view: that Section 2 permits Congress to 
enforce Section 1 by passing ―pure‖ enforcement legislation, as well as 
prophylactic legislation. Appropriate prophylactic legislation under 
Section 2 will target the necessary incidents and badges of slavery as a 
means of vindicating Section 1 and preventing the de facto reemergence of 
slavery. This approach would validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, 
potentially, a small range of additional civil rights laws. This view 
vindicates the understanding of Section 2 advanced by the proponents of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and fits comfortably within the Supreme 
Court‘s current case law on prophylactic enforcement legislation. Further, 
by regarding the badges and incidents of slavery as a term of art with a 
fixed range of meaning, it constrains Congress‘s substantive power to 
expand the ends of the Thirteenth Amendment and thus minimizes 
separation-of-powers and federalism concerns. 
This Article concludes that the ―middle‖ view should prevail, and that 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is best read to give Congress 
broad discretion over the means by which the Thirteenth Amendment is 
implemented, but more limited discretion with respect to its proper ends. 
In passing prophylactic legislation, Congress cannot define the badges and 
incidents of slavery for itself, as Jones suggested, but rather must operate 
within the boundaries of the concept as understood through history and 
interpreted by the courts. Thus, Congress‘s discretion is limited to 
determining which badges and incidents of slavery it will address and how 
to address them. While courts should defer to the remedial aspects of 
Congress‘s actions, they should review actively the ends of such 
prophylactic legislation. Implemented in this way, the Thirteenth 
Amendment‘s enforcement power will be sufficiently vigorous to allow 
Congress to enact core race-based civil rights protections. At the same 
time, though, this reading will cabin efforts to transform the Thirteenth 
Amendment into a source of wide-ranging federal power. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/2
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I. BACKGROUND: CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
A. The Reconstruction Amendments’ Enforcement Powers 
President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 
1863, freeing slaves in states whose citizens were ―in rebellion against the 
United States.‖27 In late 1863 and early 1864, several constitutional 
amendments were proposed in Congress to abolish slavery in the entire 
United States,
28
 but the efforts to pass such a provision began in earnest 
only in January 1864 when the Senate Judiciary Committee, led by 
Chairman Lyman Trumbull, began to draft an amendment abolishing 
slavery.
29
  
The first section of the proposed amendment was ultimately modeled 
on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which declared that ―[t]here shall be 
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise 
than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.‖30 The second section of the proposed amendment was based 
on language offered by Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa that 
―Congress shall have power to enforce the foregoing section of this article 
by appropriate legislation.‖31 Thus, as ratified in 1865, Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment declares that ―[n]either slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.‖32 Section 2 of that Amendment states that ―Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖33  
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment served as a model for 
enforcement clauses in the two other Reconstruction Amendments—the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth—as well as five subsequent constitutional 
 
 
 27. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 36 
(2004). 
 28. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, 
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 49–53 (2001) (summarizing proposals). 
 29. Id. at 53.  
 30. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-West of the 
River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 (1789). 
 31. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 21 (1863). Other proposals provided that ―the 
Congress may make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to enforce this prohibition.‖ Id. at 
1482 (proposal of Sen. Henderson); see also id. at 1483 (proposal by Sen. Sumner that ―[a]ll persons 
are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave; and the Congress may make all 
laws necessary and proper to carry this declaration into effect everywhere within the United States and 
the jurisdiction thereof‖). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 33. Id. § 2. 
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amendments.
34
 The enforcement provisions of the three Reconstruction 
Amendments are worded in virtually identical ways: 
 
Thirteenth 
Amendment, § 2 
―Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.‖35 
 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, § 5 
―The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.‖36 
 
Fifteenth 
Amendment, § 2 
―The Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.‖37 
 
 
To be sure, there are minute textual differences among the three 
provisions. However, the operative language in each is the same: Congress 
is mandatorily vested (―shall have‖) with the ―power to enforce,‖ and that 
power is limited to ―appropriate legislation.‖  
B. Thirteenth Amendment Legislation 
Congress has passed a number of civil and criminal statutes pursuant to 
its Section 2 power. Most of those statutes target practices that are closely 
linked with slavery and involuntary servitude. For example, in 1867, 
Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act, which imposes civil and criminal 
penalties for ―the holding of any person to service or labor under the 
system known as peonage.‖38 Peonage is ―a status or condition of 
compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the 
master.‖39 Other provisions of the criminal code outlaw the slave trade;40 
 
 
 34. See id. amends. XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI. 
 35. Id. amend. XIII, § 2. 
 36. Id. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 1 of the Amendment grants federal and state citizenship to ―[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States,‖ and forbids any state to ―abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; [or] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖ Id. 
§ 1. 
 37. See id. amend. XV, § 2. Section 1 provides that ―[t]he right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.‖ Id. § 1. 
 38. The criminal provision of the Anti-Peonage Act is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006), 
and the civil provision is at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006). 
 39. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
 40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1585–1588 (2006). The use of vessels in the slave trade is specifically 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/2
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prohibit involuntary servitude;
41
 and penalize forced labor,
42
 human 
trafficking,
43
 and sex trafficking.
44
 
Other statutes passed pursuant to Congress‘s Section 2 power go well 
beyond prohibiting and remedying slavery and involuntary servitude. 
Congress‘s first act after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment was 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That law has been reenacted 
and recodified several times, and its main provision today is codified in 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981(a) and 1982. Section 1981(a) states:  
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other.
45
 
Section 1982 states: ―All citizens of the United States shall have the same 
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
 
 
prohibited as well. See id. § 1582. 
 41. See id. § 1584. Other statutes also penalize enticement and kidnapping for the purpose of 
keeping a person in slavery or involuntary servitude, see id. § 1583, and prohibit the removal of 
official documents for the purpose of keeping a person in slavery, peonage, or involuntary servitude, 
see id. § 1592. 
 42. See id. § 1589.  
 43. See id. § 1590. This section was a portion of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Prevention Act of 2000, which Congress passed as an exercise of its Thirteenth Amendment power to 
combat involuntary servitude, as well as an exercise of its Commerce Clause power. See Pub. L. No. 
106-386, § 102(b)(12), 114 Stat. 1466 (2000). The Act took broad-ranging action to prevent and 
remedy human trafficking, which it called ―the largest manifestation of slavery today.‖ Id. § 102(b)(1). 
Finding that victims are often forced through ―sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment, threats, 
psychological abuse, and coercion‖ to ―perform slavery-like labor,‖ id. § 102(b)(6), Congress banned 
labor obtained through ―threats of serious harm,‖ ―physical restraint,‖ or threats that ―another person 
would suffer harm or physical restraint.‖ Id. § 112 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1589). This provision was 
intended to supersede the Supreme Court‘s holding in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 
(1988), that 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which prohibits holding someone in ―involuntary servitude,‖ applies 
only to servitude accomplished through the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. 
 44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006). Section 1595 also provides a civil remedy for victims of forced 
labor or trafficking. Another Reconstruction-era civil rights statute passed pursuant to Congress‘s 
Section 2 power is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). That provision provides a cause of action 
against those who conspire ―for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws,‖ where ―another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any 
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.‖ Id. The criminal analogue of § 1985(3) is codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 241. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006). 
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property.‖46 Both provisions have been interpreted broadly to cover a 
variety of private discriminatory acts,
47
 and they have been interpreted in 
tandem with each other.
48
 
In the modern era, the Fair Housing Act was passed as Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968.
49
 In its original iteration, the Act made it 
unlawful ―[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer 
. . . a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national 
origin.‖50 Since then, the Act has been amended to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sex and familial status as well.
51
 While courts have upheld 
the Act under Congress‘s commerce power, some courts have also upheld 
it—at least as applied to acts of racial discrimination—as ―a valid exercise 
of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate 
badges and incidents of slavery.‖52  
The most recent piece of Thirteenth Amendment legislation is the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, signed 
by President Obama on October 28, 2009.
53
 The law imposes significant 
penalties on ―whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully 
causes bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion,‖ national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender 
 
 
 46. Id. § 1982. 
 47. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to race 
discrimination in contracts for private school education); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968) (holding that § 1982 applies to race discrimination in private housing developments); see also 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (holding that whites, as well as 
racial minorities, can bring a § 1981 action); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 
431, 440 (1973) (holding that ―property‖ protected by § 1982 includes preferences in application 
process for membership in neighborhood pool). 
 48. See, e.g., Tillman, 410 U.S. at 439–40 (―The operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is 
traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866 . . . . In light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and 
§ 1982 [there is] no reason to construe these sections differently . . . .‖).  
 49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 804(a), 82 Stat. 73, 83 (1968) (prior to 1988 amendment). 
 51. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title VIII, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1975) (adding ―sex‖ as 
protected category); Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 6(a)–(b)(2), (e), 15, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636 
(1988) (adding ―familial status‖ as a protected category). The Act is codified currently at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604, and certain provisions bar discrimination on the basis of handicap as well. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(c) (2006). 
 52. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Williams v. Matthews 
Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974). The amendments that added sex, familial status, and handicap 
as protected categories have been held to be proper under the Commerce Clause, but not the Thirteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 828–29 (D. Nev. 1994) (familial 
status); Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1992) 
(handicap). 
 53. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701–
4713, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–44 (2009).  
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identity, or disability of the victim.
54
 The law‘s findings squarely ground 
its provisions targeting crimes based on race, color, national origin, and 
religion in Congress‘s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power.55 
Thus, while a majority of Thirteenth Amendment statutes target 
conduct associated with slavery and involuntary servitude, a minority are 
civil rights statutes that target discriminatory and violent conduct far 
removed from coerced labor. Most in this minority focus on racial 
discrimination. Sections 1981 and 1982, for example, are commonly used 
to remedy racial discrimination in a variety of contexts, including 
employment contracts,
56
 workplace retaliation,
57
 retail sales,
58
 and housing 
contracts.
59
 Some laws, however—including the Fair Housing Act and the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act—
 
 
 54. Id. § 4707 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006) 
(making it a federal crime for any person to injure another because of the victim‘s race, color, religion, 
or national origin and because the victim was participating in or enjoying a public service or facility). 
The hate crimes provision in § 245(b)(2)(B) has been upheld as valid Thirteenth Amendment 
legislation, even as applied to violence against Jewish people. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 
164, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 55. Section 4702 of the bill contains the following ―Findings‖: 
For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude were defined by the race, 
color, and ancestry of those held in bondage. Slavery and involuntary servitude were 
enforced, both prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because 
of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Accordingly, eliminating 
racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the 
badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude. 
Moreover, 
[b]oth at the time when the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States were adopted, and continuing to date, members of certain religious and national origin 
groups were and are perceived to be distinct ‗races‘. Thus, in order to eliminate, to the extent 
possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery, it is necessary to prohibit assaults on the 
basis of real or perceived religions or national origins, at least to the extent such religions or 
national origins were regarded as races at the time of the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.  
§ 4702(8). This caveat refers to two Supreme Court decisions in which the Court held that certain 
religious groups, namely Jews and Muslims, were deemed to be separate races in the mid-1800s and, 
thus, discrimination against these groups was racial discrimination. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. 
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (permitting claim of racial discrimination under § 1982 by Caucasian 
Jews); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (permitting claim of racial 
discrimination under § 1981 by an Arab Muslim). These findings, however, do not necessarily limit 
the operative language of the law, which, on its face, applies to hate crimes committed against any 
person on the basis of ―religion.‖ 
 56. See, e.g., Kennedy v. D.C. Gov‘t, 519 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2007); Seldon v. Nat‘l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 57. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008). 
 58. See, e.g., Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 59. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage 
Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D. Del. 2007). 
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protect a broader swath of civil rights by barring discrimination on the 
basis of religion, as well as race, color, and national origin.
60
 These 
religion-based protections have applied to more than just religious groups 
like Jews and Muslims, whose members were regarded as separate races at 
the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.
61
 The Fair Housing Act, 
for example, has been used to protect non-Catholics
62
 and to prohibit 
special treatment for Mormons
63
 and ―churchgoers and people of faith.‖64 
C. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Congress’s Enforcement Powers 
When Congress included enforcement language in Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, it was not importing a new and untested concept 
into the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland was the first and seminal 
case to discuss the scope of Congress‘s enforcement powers.65 In 
McCulloch, the Court considered the constitutionality of Congress‘s 1816 
decision to charter the Second Bank of the United States. A number of 
states attempted to tax the Bank, and the state of Maryland went further, 
challenging Congress‘s power to charter the Bank in the first place. Chief 
 
 
 60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 61. Cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (permitting claim of racial 
discrimination under § 1982 by Caucasian Jews); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 
(1987) (permitting claim of racial discrimination under § 1981 by an Arab Muslim).  
 62. See United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (non-Catholics 
successfully sued a country club that barred them from selling or leasing homes on the club‘s 
premises). 
 63. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Utah Antidiscrimination and 
Labor Division, and ACLU of Utah used the Fair Housing Act to successfully pressure the city of 
Provo, Utah, to rework a proposed housing ordinance that would have discriminated against non-
Mormons by exempting Brigham Young University students, 98.5% of whom are Mormon, from a 
requirement that all rental housing applicants must be subject to criminal background checks. See 
Controversial Provo Ordinance Proposal Draws ACLU Ire, ACLU OF UTAH REP., Sept. 2008, at 6, 
available at http://www.acluutah.org/08Septnewsletter.pdf (reporting change in proposed ordinance); 
Ace Stryker, Cleanup or Shakedown: Provo Rental Ordinance Under Microscope, UTAH DAILY 
HERALD, June 29, 2008, available at http://www.heraldextra.com/content/view/271768/17/; Letter 
from Marina Lowe, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc., to Provo City 
Council (July 15, 2008), http://www.acluutah.org/ltr_Provo_City_Council_LL_Ordinance.pdf. 
 64. Fair housing groups used the Act to sue a homeowners‘ insurance company that provided 
special products to ―churchgoers and people of faith,‖ and then obtained a settlement that expanded the 
company‘s policies. See Nat‘l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:07-cv-
03643-SL (N.D. Ohio complaint filed Nov. 26, 2007); Rick Armon, Policy Specials Called Illegal in 
Suit: Insurance Company Caters to Christians, Say Fair Housing Groups,‖ AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 
28, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071202041637/www.ohio.com/news/top_stories/11880156. 
html?page=all&c=y; see also Nat‘l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. GuideOne Mutual Ins. Co., No. 5:07-
cv-03643-SL (N.D. Ohio settlement order filed Mar. 13, 2009); Sarah Buckley, GuideOne Insurance 
News Release, Fair Housing Media Statement, GUIDEONE INSURANCE (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www. 
guideone.com/AboutUs/NewsReleases/09fairhousing.html. 
 65. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, addressed this question 
by remarking first that the Constitution does not ―partake of the prolixity 
of a legal code,‖66 but rather outlines those ―important objects‖ from 
which ―minor ingredients which compose those objects [may] be 
deduced.‖67 Thus, the Constitution sets out a broad set of goals and confers 
on Congress the power to create mechanisms to effectuate those goals. 
That power is not only implied from the nature of the Constitution itself, 
but also derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which explicitly 
gives Congress the power to make ―all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution.‖68 Marshall concluded that this clause 
grants Congress wide discretion ―to adopt any [means] which might be 
appropriate, and which were conducive to [constitutional] ends.‖69 When 
such means are challenged in a judicial forum, Marshall set forth the 
parameters by which such legislative choices should be judged: 
 We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government 
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we 
think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the 
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by 
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which 
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the 
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.
70
 
The Court invoked the McCulloch principle in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
the decision upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1793.
71
 Congress passed the Act as a means to enforce the Fugitive Slave 
Clause of Article IV, which gave slave owners the right to recapture slaves 
who had fled into other states, but did not specifically authorize 
congressional legislation to enforce that right. The Court held that 
Congress had broad implied powers to enforce and create a prophylactic 
 
 
 66. Id. at 407. 
 67. Id.  
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 69. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. 
 70. Id. at 421. 
 71. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
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remedy for that individual right.
72
 Prigg thus extended McCulloch‘s broad 
view of congressional power beyond the Article I context.  
By the Reconstruction era, McCulloch and Prigg provided the 
prevailing framework regarding the scope of Congress‘s power to 
effectuate the express provisions of the Constitution.
73
 As both cases 
established, that power was wide ranging, and courts would provide 
virtually complete deference to any means chosen by Congress to 
vindicate constitutional ends. The Reconstruction Amendments were 
written against this backdrop, but went further by including provisions that 
expressly provided for congressional enforcement power. In the late 
1960s, the Warren Court issued a trio of decisions on the scope of 
Congress‘s powers under the Reconstruction Amendments that explicitly 
invoked the McCulloch approach. 
The first decision was South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
74
 which upheld 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a proper exercise of 
Congress‘s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the 
Act required covered jurisdictions, mainly in the South, to receive 
preclearance for any new ―standard, practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting.‖75 The Court held that McCulloch provided ―[t]he basic test to be 
applied,‖76 and that ―Congress may use any rational means to effectuate 
the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.‖77 Citing 
extensive evidence regarding voting discrimination in most of the covered 
jurisdictions, the Court found that Congress was ―entitled to infer a 
significant danger of the evil in the few remaining States and political 
subdivisions covered‖78 and upheld both the coverage formula and 
remedial provisions as rational and appropriate.
79
 
The Court turned to the Fourteenth Amendment‘s enforcement power 
in Katzenbach v. Morgan.
80
 That case dealt with the constitutionality of 
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which barred states from 
requiring that graduates of Puerto Rican elementary schools pass an 
English literacy test in order to vote—even though the Supreme Court had 
 
 
 72. Id. at 619. 
 73. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional 
Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (2004). 
 74. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 75. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006)). 
 76. 383 U.S. at 326. 
 77. Id. at 324. 
 78. Id. at 329. 
 79. Id. at 329–37. 
 80. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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held in a prior case that the use of literacy tests was constitutional.
81
 The 
Morgan Court again held that McCulloch governed the review of exercises 
of any enforcement power
82
 and that the Court must grant Congress wide 
discretion and uphold any enactment as long as the Court can ―perceive a 
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.‖83  
The Court indicated that there were two possible bases for Congress‘s 
action, one remedial and one substantive. Congress might simply have 
been acting to remedy widespread unconstitutional discrimination against 
Puerto Ricans by enhancing their voting power.
84
 Alternatively, Congress 
might have made the substantive judgment that the use of literacy tests 
was unconstitutional, despite the Court‘s holding to the contrary.85 Indeed, 
the Court stated that Congress‘s enforcement power did not ―require a 
judicial determination [that the state practice in question] violated the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment‖ because otherwise ―the legislative power 
[would be confined] to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state 
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.‖86 
Either way, the Court found that Congress was attempting to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s guarantee of equal protection and, therefore, 
deference was warranted.  
Justice Harlan dissented, claiming that the majority read Section 5 ―as 
giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the 
Amendment‖—a job properly performed only by the judiciary.87 In his 
view, Section 5 gave ―Congress wide powers in the field of devising 
remedial legislation . . . to cure an established violation of a constitutional 
command,‖88 but reserved for the federal judiciary the ultimate question of 
whether particular state conduct in fact violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
89
 The majority‘s willingness to vest wide and largely 
unreviewable discretion in Congress to go beyond judicial interpretations, 
 
 
 81. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 82. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651. 
 83. Id. at 653. 
 84. Id. at 652–53. Congress‘s power under this rationale is relatively uncontroversial. See Ronald 
D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 172 (1998); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1230 (1978). 
 85. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653–54. 
 86. Id. at 648–49. 
 87. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 666–67. 
 89. See id. at 667. In addressing substantive constitutional claims, the Court would give due 
deference to congressional findings regarding unconstitutional behavior, see id. at 668, but Harlan 
noted that Congress made no findings regarding the need for section 4(e) and chided the majority for 
hypothesizing a rational basis for the legislation, see id. at 669. 
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Harlan argued, would give Congress power, not only to provide further 
protection for individual rights, but also ―to dilute equal protection and 
due process decisions of this Court.‖90  
The Court finally turned to the Thirteenth Amendment in 1968. Three 
years earlier, Joseph and Barbara Jones, an interracial couple, applied to 
purchase a home in a new suburban St. Louis, Missouri, subdivision. An 
agent of the developer, Alfred H. Mayer Co., refused to consider their 
application, informing them that the company had a ―‗general policy not to 
sell houses and lots to Negroes.‘‖91 The Joneses brought suit, alleging that 
the company‘s policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the property conveyance 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
92
 After both the district court 
and court of appeals ruled that § 1982 applied only to state action and not 
private refusals to sell, the Joneses brought their case before the Supreme 
Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
93
 
The Court spent the bulk of its analysis considering whether § 1982 
should be read to prohibit all racial discrimination in property 
conveyances, both public and private.
94
 Concluding that it should, the 
Court then turned to the question of whether it was within Congress‘s 
power to enact such a prohibition: ―Does the authority of Congress to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment ‗by appropriate legislation‘ include the 
power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal 
 
 
 90. Id. at 668. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, responded to Justice Harlan‘s final 
concern in a footnote, asserting that such deference was a sort of one-way ratchet and would not apply 
to any congressional statute that attempted ―‗to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of 
this Court‘‖ because ―[Section 5] grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these 
guarantees.‖ Id. at 651 n.10 (majority opinion). The ―ratchet‖ image was first coined in Jeffery L. 
Yablon, Developments, Congressional Power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 
STAN. L. REV. 885, 894 (1973), and Brennan‘s ―ratchet theory‖ is very controversial. See, e.g., Sager, 
supra note 84, at 1230–39. ―The notion that Congress‘ power is unidirectional is by no means 
analytically essential to the result in Katzenbach v. Morgan, or to a judicial deference rationale.‖ Id. at 
1231 n.63; see also, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds, inter alia, extension of federal franchise to 18-year-olds). In Oregon, Justice 
Brennan, writing for himself and Justices White and Marshall, offered a further defense of his 
―ratchet‖ theory, reiterating that although Section 5 was a broad grant of power to Congress, 
―Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution[,] . . . strip the States of 
their power to govern themselves[,] . . . [or] undercut the Amendments‘ guarantees of personal 
equality and freedom from discrimination . . . .‖ Id. at 266–67 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). This theory ultimately was rejected by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores. See 
infra Part I.D. 
 91. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966). 
 92. See id. at 118–19. 
 93. 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968). 
 94. Id. at 420–37. Justice Harlan filed a strong dissent on this question, arguing that the 
majority‘s ―construction of § 1982 as applying to purely private action is almost surely wrong and, at 
the least is open to serious doubt.‖ Id. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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property?‖95 In the Court‘s view, ―the answer to that question [was] 
plainly yes.‖96 
The Court inquired whether the substantive goal of eliminating racial 
discrimination in property conveyances was a permissible ―end‖ of 
Thirteenth Amendment legislation. Citing dicta from the 1883 Civil Rights 
Cases, the Court found it ―clear that the Enabling Clause of [the 
Thirteenth] Amendment empowered Congress to do much more‖ than 
abolish slavery.
97
 Section 2 instead ―clothed ‗Congress with power to pass 
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of 
slavery in the United States,‘‖98 including ―the sort of positive legislation 
that was embodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.‖99 The Court stated the 
standard by which congressional action would be judged: ―Surely 
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to 
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the 
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.‖100 Thus, 
in choosing a substantive target for legislation, Congress must determine 
that the conduct in question is a ―badge‖ or ―incident‖ of slavery—a 
determination subject solely to rational basis review.  
In addition to its expansive vision of the proper ―ends‖ of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the Court endorsed the McCulloch view of how to 
assess the ―means‖ by which Congress chooses to achieve its goals, stating 
that Congress may choose any means it deems ―‗necessary and proper‘‖ to 
regulate the badges and incidents of slavery.
101
 As in South Carolina and 
Morgan, this language incorporated the highly deferential rational basis 
test for measuring legislation set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland. 
With respect to § 1982, the Court endorsed as rational Congress‘s 
finding that the property developer‘s race-based refusal to sell property to 
the Joneses was a badge and incident of slavery: ―[W]hen racial 
discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
 
 
 95. Id. at 439. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). See infra notes 267–88 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Civil Rights Cases. 
 98. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 99. Id. at 439–40. The Court pointed specifically to statements made by Senator Lyman 
Trumbull and Representative James Wilson in defense of the 1866 Act. See id. at 440 (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322 (1866)) (asserting that Section 2 gave Congress the power to 
―destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man . . . . Who is to decide what that 
appropriate legislation is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such 
appropriate legislation as it may think proper . . . .‖); id. at 443–44. 
 100. Id. at 440. 
 101. See id. at 439. 
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property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.‖102 
Moreover, the Court found that Congress‘s decision to ban that conduct 
was a rational way to address that relic of slavery.
103
 
Justice Douglas concurred in Jones, agreeing with the majority that 
Section 2 empowered Congress to ―remov[e] . . . badges of slavery.‖104 In 
his view, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 took aim at ―some‖ badges and 
incidents of slavery, but others persisted into modern times.
105
 Justice 
Douglas catalogued the ―spectacle of slavery unwilling to die,‖ including 
state actions, such as laws designed to keep African Americans from 
voting and from jury service, antimiscegenation laws, segregation in 
courtrooms and schools, and segregation in public facilities.
106
 He also 
included private actions, including refusals to sell or rent property to 
African Americans, to provide service in restaurants and motels, and to 
admit African Americans to labor unions.
107
  
The Jones Court thus placed its imprimatur on the view that Section 2 
constituted a significant grant of legislative power, both to define the 
permissible ends of legislation (i.e., by defining the ―badges and incidents 
of slavery‖) and to craft effective means to accomplish those ends. Jones 
also confirmed that legislation passed pursuant to Section 2 deserves 
substantial judicial deference. In essence, Jones utilized an enhanced 
McCulloch v. Maryland-type view of Section 2. In the words of one 
commentator, Jones expanded ―the legitimate ends under the [Thirteenth 
 
 
 102. Id. at 442–43. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court itself had stated previously that the badges 
and incidents of slavery ―included restraints upon ‗those fundamental rights which are the essence of 
civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.‘‖ Id. at 441 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)) 
(alteration in original). The Court‘s use of the term ―relic‖ and its relationship to ―badges and 
incidents‖ is not entirely clear. Id. at 441. On one hand, it could just be a poetic twist offered by the 
Court. However, Professor Lawrence Sager has argued that there is an important distinction between 
―badges and incidents of slavery,‖ which are the ―contemporary attributes‖ of slavery, and the ―relics 
of slavery,‖ which are its ―deeply ingrained, enduring consequences‖ such as the history of race 
discrimination. See Sager, supra note 25, at 152 (arguing that Jones’ explanation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power provides a template for understanding how the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power might justify the Violence Against Women Act). 
 103. Jones, 392 U.S. at 444. Eight years after Jones, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 
(1976), the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 barred race discrimination in contracts for private 
educational services and that, so applied, Section 1981 was a valid exercise of Congress‘s Section 2 
power. 
 104. Jones, 392 U.S. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 105. Id. at 449. 
 106. See id. at 445–46. 
 107. See id. at 447. The second Justice Harlan dissented, arguing primarily that the majority‘s 
construction of the statute was imprudent and incorrect. See id. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He 
noted briefly, however, that the Court‘s ruling on Congress‘s constitutional authority to pass § 1982 
was dubious. See id. at 476–77. 
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Amendment] . . . from abolition of slavery to eliminating the 
consequences of slavery, with a concomitant increase in the appropriate 
means that Congress could choose to reach those ends.‖108  
Since Jones, federal courts have upheld at least seven statutes 
challenged on Thirteenth Amendment grounds and struck down none.
109
 
Congressional determinations that a variety of practices—from racial 
discrimination in private clubs to religion-based violence in public 
facilities—constitute badges and incidents of slavery have been upheld, 
with courts generally deferring to Congress and engaging in little to no 
independent analysis.
110
 While Jones has not been applied outside the 
Thirteenth Amendment context,
111
 it has proven to be a highly deferential 
standard when applied to laws passed under the Section 2 power. Though 
Congress has not passed an overwhelming amount of Thirteenth 
Amendment legislation, its Section 2 efforts have been uniformly upheld 
under Jones. 
 
 
 108. See George Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to 
Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
ABOLITIONISM AND ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Alexander Tsesis ed., forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 14), available at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art68. 
 109. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (upholding § 1981 as applied to race 
discrimination in contracts for private school education); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) 
(holding that § 1985 was a valid exercise of the Thirteenth Amendment power); Mitchell v. Cellone, 
389 F.3d 86 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631, to be a valid 
exercise of the Thirteenth Amendment power); United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that acts of violence prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) imposed a badge or incident of 
involuntary servitude on their victims and thus could be prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment 
power); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), prohibiting 
violent interference with enjoyment of a public facility, could be applied to religious and/or racial 
attacks against Jews as a valid exercise of the Thirteenth Amendment power); United States v. Garcia, 
No. 02-CR-1105-01, 2003 WL 22938040 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003) (holding that the Migrant and 
Seasonal Worker Protection Act was a valid exercise of the Thirteenth Amendment power); U.S. v. 
Nicholson, 185 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241, the civil rights 
conspiracy statute, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, the criminal provision of the Fair Housing Act, are valid 
exercises of the Thirteenth Amendment power). 
 110. See, e.g., Nelson, 277 F.3d 164; Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235, 241–42 
(6th Cir. 1990) (holding that denying service at a private club violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981); United 
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120–21 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the ―anti-
blockbusting‖ provision of the Fair Housing Act was valid under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Fair 
Housing Act was a valid exercise of Congress‘s Thirteenth Amendment power); Espinoza v. Hillwood 
Square Mut. Ass‘n, 522 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1981) (upholding the application of the Fair Housing 
Act to discrimination based on ancestry). 
 111. See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Politics 
of Civil Rights 2 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2009-10, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473160 (noting that the significance of Jones and Section 2 is ―far less 
than the Commerce Clause, or perhaps even section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, both of which 
support most modern civil rights legislation‖). 
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D. A New View of Congress’s Enforcement Powers: City of Boerne v. 
Flores 
In 1997, the Supreme Court took a sharp turn in its approach to 
legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
City of Boerne v. Flores,
112
 the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA). RFRA had been enacted in response to—indeed, 
to overrule—the Court‘s earlier holding in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.
113
 Whereas Smith held that 
neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices 
even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest,
114
 RFRA 
required that any such law be supported by a compelling interest and be 
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
115
 Thus, the question 
for the Court was whether RFRA was validly enacted pursuant to 
Congress‘s Section 5 power.116 
The majority held that Section 5 did not empower Congress to pass 
RFRA.
117
 The Court began by acknowledging that Section 5 is ―‗a positive 
grant of legislative power.‘‖118 However, the Court clarified, the power to 
―enforc[e]‖ the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment is a ―‗remedial‘‖ 
power and not one to ―decree the substance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s restrictions on the States‖ or ―to determine what constitutes 
a constitutional violation.‖119 The latter power resides with the Court itself.  
On this point, City of Boerne characterized Katzenbach v. Morgan as 
an unexceptional case in which Congress had enacted a ―reasonable‖ law 
 
 
 112. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 113. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 114. See id. at 884–85. 
 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
 116. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511. 
 117. Id. at 536. Justices O‘Connor, Souter, and Breyer dissented on the ground that Smith had 
been incorrectly decided. Id. at 544–66 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting; Souter, J., dissenting; and Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Justice O‘Connor, however, made it clear that she agreed with the majority‘s analysis 
regarding the scope of Congress‘s Section 5 power. See id. at 545 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 517 (majority opinion) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). 
 119. Id. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). The Court 
noted that ―[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‗superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means.‘‖ Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The Court 
found support for the remedial-substantive distinction in the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See id. at 520. But see Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002) (cataloguing historical errors in majority opinion); 
Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores 
and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115 (1999) (questioning majority‘s 
reading of the legislative history). 
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in response to ―unconstitutional discrimination by [the state of] New 
York.‖120 Thus, the Court claimed that ―interpreting Morgan to give 
Congress the power to interpret the Constitution ‗would require an 
enormous extension of that decision‘s rationale.‘‖121 Despite the Court‘s 
claim that Morgan was consistent with the mode of analysis in City of 
Boerne, the majority opinion hewed much more closely to Justice Harlan‘s 
Morgan dissent, which emphasized that the Court should preserve its own 
supreme role in interpreting the Constitution. 
The City of Boerne Court acknowledged that ―the line between 
measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures 
that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, 
and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies.‖122 
Further, the Court made clear that legislation can be remedial and thus 
constitutional, ―even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not 
itself unconstitutional.‖123 However, the Court made clear that it will 
measure the propriety of a congressional act under Section 5 by asking 
whether there is ―a congruence and proportionality between the injury to 
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.‖124 RFRA, 
which was a thinly veiled attempt to overrule the Supreme Court‘s ruling 
in Smith, failed to satisfy that test.
125
 Without identifying any instances of 
deliberate religious persecution by a state,
126
 Congress drafted a law with 
―[s]weeping coverage‖ that imposed ―substantial costs‖ on the states.127 
The Court concluded that RFRA was far ―out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventive object.‖128 
Since City of Boerne, the Court has held that several civil rights 
statutes failed to satisfy the congruence and proportionality test,
129
 while 
 
 
 120. 521 U.S. at 528. The City of Boerne Court thus determined that the first rationale of the 
Morgan Court—that Congress had perceived and sought to remedy unconstitutional discrimination 
against New York‘s Puerto Rican population—was the most plausible explanation for the Court‘s 
judgment. Id.; see also supra note 84. 
 121. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970)). 
 122. Id. at 519–20. 
 123. Id. at 518. 
 124. Id. at 520.  
 125. See id. at 530–36. 
 126. See id. at 530. 
 127. See id. at 532, 534. 
 128. Id. at 532. 
 129. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against 
Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act). 
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two others were valid exercises of Congress‘s Section 5 power.130 In this 
series of cases, the Court has refined and clarified the ―congruence and 
proportionality‖ test, stating that the inquiry should proceed according to a 
number of steps. First, a court must confirm that Congress has chosen ―an 
appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation‖131 by ―identify[ing] the 
constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce‖ through the 
statute in question,
132
 and ensuring that Congress—in its legislative history 
and findings—―‗identified a history and pattern‘‖ of constitutional 
violations by the states with respect to that right.
133
 Assuming there is such 
a legislative record, the court must then determine whether the statute in 
question ―is an appropriate response to this history and pattern‖134 by 
asking whether the rights and remedies created by the statute are 
congruent and proportional to the constitutional right being enforced and 
the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress.
135
  
Although there are differences of opinion on the propriety of City of 
Boerne‘s approach,136 scholars and courts alike generally agree that the 
―congruence and proportionality‖ standard endorsed by City of Boerne is 
significantly more stringent than the rational basis test of Morgan.
137
 First, 
 
 
 130. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(as applied to access to the courts)); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
 131. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. 
 132. Id. at 522. Notably, in both Hibbs and Lane, Congress was seeking to protect a class of 
people (women) or protect a fundamental right (access to the courts) that warrants heightened judicial 
scrutiny. In such cases, the Court has explained, ―it [will be] easier for Congress to show a pattern of 
state constitutional violations.‖ Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.  
 133. Lane, 541 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368). The 
focus on state action derives from the longstanding rule that private conduct does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (―Individual invasion 
of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.‖); United States v. 
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883) (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)) (―‗[T]hese 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to state action exclusively, and not to any 
action of private individuals.‘‖). 
 134. Lane, 541 U.S. at 530 (majority opinion). 
 135. See id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 136. Compare, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of 
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 
470 (1999) (supporting City of Boerne and characterizing it as ―the first modern reiteration . . . of time-
honored constitutional and remedial principles‖), and Rotunda, supra note 84, at 179 (defending 
―congruence and proportionality‖ standard), with Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the 
Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) 
(arguing for return to rational basis review in the Section 5 context), and Melissa Hart, Conflating 
Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court’s ―Strict Scrutiny‖ of Congressional 
Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1102 (2001) (advocating 
judicial restraint in which ―only very clear constitutional violations by democratically-elected 
legislators should be found unconstitutional by the courts‖). 
 137. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 25, at 1133 (―Section 5 measures have ‗suddenly been 
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by limiting Congress to a remedial role, City of Boerne forecloses any 
substantive participation by Congress in the development of constitutional 
norms.
138
 Second, by requiring Congress to craft remedies that are 
congruent and proportional to specifically determined constitutional 
violations, City of Boerne limits the range of Congress‘s discretion.139 
Professor Evan Caminker has argued that ―congruence‖ and 
―proportionality‖ are two distinct inquiries that mirror, but tighten 
substantially, the minimal scrutiny involved in the McCulloch ―necessary 
and proper‖ analysis. The congruence inquiry ―mimics the requirement 
that executory Article I legislation be ‗proper‘‖140 and asks ―whether the 
measure actually prevents or remedies a sufficient quantity of identifiable 
constitutional violations or is instead too underinclusive.‖141 The 
proportionality inquiry corresponds ―to the question of ‗necessity‘ for 
Article I legislation,‖142 as both focus on ―the calibration or balance 
between the magnitude of the prophylactic remedy and the magnitude of 
the wrong or problem being addressed.‖143 However, the question of 
necessity ―is not subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny in the Article I 
context,‖144 while the City of Boerne line of cases ―applies rigorous 
scrutiny‖ to legislative judgments.145 Thus, City of Boerne is best regarded 
as a substantial departure from Morgan—and McCulloch—in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context. 
 
 
saddled with something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuating what can only be 
understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality.‘‖ (quoting 1 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 959 (3d ed. 2000))); Michael W. McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 165 
(1997) (The ―‗congruence and proportionality‘ standard appears to be more rigorous than the standard 
of review applied in earlier Section Five cases, such as Katzenbach v. Morgan.‖); cf. Nw. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235 (D.D.C. 2008) (characterizing City of 
Boerne and South Carolina v. Katzenbach as articulating ―two distinct standards for evaluating the 
constitutionality of laws enforcing the Civil War Amendments,‖ with the former being ―more 
rigorous‖ and the latter being ―less demanding‖). 
 138. Many have argued that there is an appropriate interpretive role for Congress with respect to 
the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional 
Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61; Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (1998); McConnell, supra note 137; Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
 139. See Caminker, supra note 25, at 1133. 
 140. Id. at 1156. 
 141. Id. at 1154. 
 142. Id. at 1156. 
 143. Id. at 1154. 
 144. Id. at 1156. 
 145. Id. at 1158. 
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In 2009, when confronted with a challenge to Congress‘s 2006 
extension of the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court ducked the question of whether and how the City of 
Boerne standard should affect Fifteenth Amendment legislation.
146
 While 
this question continues to percolate in the courts, the focus of this paper is 
on the Thirteenth Amendment: whether Jones articulates the proper 
standard of review for Thirteenth Amendment legislation, or whether City 
of Boerne‘s renewed emphasis on judicial supremacy and separation of 
powers should affect that analysis. The next section attempts to flesh out 
the primary materials relevant to the answer. 
II. SECTION 2 OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: HISTORY AND 
STRUCTURE 
A. Original Meaning of the Scope of Section 2 
This section turns to the historical record in an effort to assess the 
original meaning of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. The two-year 
span from 1864 to 1866 afforded three moments for serious reflection on 
the meaning and scope of Congress‘s enforcement power. The first was 
the proposal and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, which led to 
sustained debate in both Congress and the states. The second was the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first piece of enforcement 
legislation proposed under Section 2. The third was the proposal of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was motivated, in part, to respond to 
concerns that the 1866 Act was beyond Congress‘s Section 2 power. 
Although the historical record yields no definitive answers, these debates 
provide a helpful lens into both the scope of the substantive right 
conferred by Section 1 and the possible boundaries of the Section 2 
power.
147
 
 
 
 146. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512–13 (2009) (noting 
the parties‘ disagreement whether ―congruence and proportionality‖ or ―rational[ity]‖ should be ―the 
standard to apply in deciding whether . . . Congress exceeded its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
power‖). 
 147. Indeed, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, City of Boerne‘s analysis of the scope of 
Congress‘s Section 5 powers rested in large part on the majority‘s understanding of the legislative 
history and original understanding of that provision. That portion of City of Boerne has been subjected 
to repeated and withering criticism, pointing out that the Court paid too much attention to the 
provision‘s opponents, see, e.g., Colker, supra note 119, at 791, and too little attention to evidence that 
the final text of Section 5 was intended to refer to and incorporate the McCulloch standard, see, e.g., 
Engel, supra note 119, at 117. Whatever historical errors underlie City of Boerne, however, should not 
stop us from looking to the Thirteenth Amendment ratification debates in Congress and the states for 
assistance in discerning the original meaning of Section 2.  
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1. Thirteenth Amendment Ratification Debates in Congress and the 
States 
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the Thirteenth Amendment 
on February 10, 1864. The full Senate debated that proposal six weeks 
later and voted 38–6 in favor on April 8, 1864.148 The House of 
Representatives debated but rejected the measure in June 1864.
149
 After 
the November 1864 elections, in which President Lincoln won reelection 
and the Republican Party boasted large gains in Congress, the House 
reconsidered the proposed amendment, passing it by the requisite two-
thirds margin (119–56) on January 31, 1865.150 
The ratification debates gave many members of Congress license to 
wax eloquent in general terms about equality,
151
 slavery,
152
 and the 
Union.
153
 However, questions regarding the precise scope of the 
substantive right conferred by Section 1 and the extent of Congress‘s 
power under Section 2 generally received scant analysis.
154
 Moreover, the 
Senators and Representatives who did speak to these issues offered a range 
of answers.
155
 
 
 
 148. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1490 (1864); see also VORENBERG, supra note 
28, at 61. 
 149. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 19 
(1990); cf. U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth process for amending the Constitution and requiring a two-
thirds vote in each house of Congress). 
 150. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 531 (1865). 
 151. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1482–83 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
But see id. at 1484 (Sen. Powell) (expressing doubts about racial equality). 
 152. See, e.g., id. at 1369. 
 153. See, e.g., id. at 1419–24; see also Note, The ―New‖ Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294, 1299 (1969) (characterizing Thirteenth Amendment debates as 
―conducted on a level of hyperbole befitting the fervor which had attached itself to the issue after thirty 
years of agitation‖). 
 154. See VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 132 (―Republicans never meant to define for future 
generations the exact rights guaranteed by the Amendment. They were interested mainly in eliminating 
the institution of slavery that had caused the war. And because few of them were able to envision a 
time without war, they saw no urgency in codifying the rights of freedom for the postwar Union.‖). 
But see id. at 190–91 (―In those few instances . . . that Republicans did discuss the specific rights and 
powers conferred by the Amendment, they evasively mentioned only those that the measure did not 
grant,‖ such as political rights like suffrage and jury service.); see also MALTZ, supra note 149, at 21 
(noting that the ―dearth of evidence‖ about the full scope of Sections 1 and 2 ―is not terribly 
surprising‖ because resolution of the basic question of federal abolition of slavery ―did not require a 
definition of the nature of slavery in the abstract or a description of the difference between ‗slavery‘ 
and ‗freedom‘ at the margins‖). 
 155. See VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 132 (―The revolutionary potential of the Amendment‘s 
enforcement clause, which after the war would be used by Congress to override state laws denying 
civil rights, seemed to be lost on congressional Republicans in 1864.‖). 
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The most limited view of Section 1 is that it guarantees solely freedom 
from coerced labor, and does not affirmatively provide for civil rights. 
One source of support for this view comes from the fact that Section 1 was 
modeled on the Northwest Ordinance, whose prohibition on slavery had 
been repeatedly viewed as compatible with civil rights restrictions on free 
blacks.
156
 For example, as Professor Earl Maltz has pointed out, until 
1857, the constitution of the State of Oregon banned slavery in language 
that paralleled the Northwest Ordinance and, at the same time, barred 
black people from making contracts and holding property.
157
 Similarly, 
during the Thirteenth Amendment debates, Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois urged passage of the Amendment as ―the only effectual way of 
ridding the country of slavery.‖158 Senator John Henderson, a Missouri 
War Democrat and early proponent of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
advocated this view as well, denying that the Amendment conferred 
―negro equality‖ and arguing that the Amendment gave the freed slave ―no 
right except his freedom.‖159  
The narrow view, however, had its detractors. As Representative 
William Holman of Indiana put it, ―[m]ere exemption from servitude is a 
miserable idea of freedom.‖160 Several members of Congress—the 
Amendment‘s supporters and opponents alike—saw Section 1 as a broader 
grant of rights. According to supporter Representative Ebon Ingersoll of 
Illinois, the Amendment secured to each ―black man . . . certain 
inalienable rights,‖ including the rights ―to live, and live in a state of 
freedom[,] . . . to till the soil, [and] to . . . enjoy the rewards of his own 
labor‖ without infringement by any ―white man.‖161 Likewise, supporter 
Senator James Harlan of Iowa suggested that the Amendment abolished 
 
 
 156. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1489 (1864) (Sen. Jacob Howard) (advocating for 
use in the Amendment of language ―employed by our fathers in the [Northwest] ordinance of 1787, an 
expression which has been adjudicated upon repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both by the 
public and by judicial tribunals‖). 
 157. See MALTZ, supra note 149, at 22 (noting that state constitutions in Oregon and Illinois used 
the antislavery language of the Northwest Ordinance side-by-side with language restricting the rights 
of free blacks).  
 158. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1314 (1864). 
 159. Id. at 1465. Professor Earl Maltz has argued that the Amendment would not have passed the 
House without the support of conservative emancipationists, and, thus, ―any broader understanding of 
the Thirteenth Amendment would have led to the defeat of the proposal in Congress.‖ MALTZ, supra 
note 149, at 24, 27. 
 160. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2962 (1864). Holman, who opposed the Amendment, 
warned that Section 1‘s abolition of slavery guaranteed both freedom from servitude and freedom to 
participate in the government. See id. Likewise, Representative Joseph Edgerton of Indiana stated that 
the Amendment would accomplish ―the political and social elevation of Negroes to all the rights of 
white men.‖ Id. at 2987. 
 161. Id. at 2990. 
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not only slavery, but the ―necessary incidents of slavery,‖ including ―the 
prohibition of the conjugal relation,‖ the ―abolition practically of the 
parental relation,‖ the inability to ―acquir[e] and hol[d] property,‖ the 
deprivation of ―a status in court‖ and ―the right to testify,‖ the 
―suppression of freedom of speech and the press,‖ and the deprivation of 
education.
162
 
The congressional debates also saw a divide of opinion regarding the 
scope of Congress‘s power under Section 2. Opponents of the Amendment 
uniformly foresaw a broad and dangerous federal power that would disrupt 
state laws and mandate political equality between the races.
163
 Supporters 
of the Amendment, by contrast, were opaque at best with respect to the 
effect of Section 2. Some appeared to take a narrow view of Congress‘s 
power. For example, Senator Harlan, despite his broad view of the rights 
conveyed by Section 1, did not explicitly anticipate any role for Congress 
in enforcing those rights.
164
  
Senator Trumbull, however, appeared to envision fairly broad 
congressional power, at least with respect to the means by which the 
Amendment should be enforced. On the day he introduced the proposed 
Amendment to the Senate, Senator Trumbull made a brief statement in 
which he paraphrased Section 2, saying it would give Congress the power 
to enforce the Amendment with ―proper‖ legislation.165 On the first day of 
 
 
 162. Id. at 1439–40; see also id. at 1324 (Rep. Wilson) (stating that the Amendment ―will 
obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; . . . all that was and is, everything connected 
with it or pertaining to it‖); Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 6 (stating that Harlan implied ―that [the] 
incidents of slavery would be abolished by the Amendment itself‖); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 177 (1951).Even for the Amendment‘s supporters, 
however, the substantive promise went only so far and did not encompass political rights such as 
voting. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 202 (1865) (Rep. McBride) (―A recognition of 
natural rights is one thing, a grant of political franchises is quite another. We extend to all white men 
the protection of law when they land upon our shores. We grant them political rights when they 
comply with the conditions which those laws prescribe. If political rights must necessarily follow the 
possession of personal liberty, then all but male citizens in our country are slaves.‖); see also supra 
note 160 (noting views of opponents). 
 163. For example, Representative Samuel Cox of Ohio, who likely thought that Section 1 
conveyed only a limited right against coerced labor, predicted federal legislation to ―declare all State 
laws based on [blacks‘] political inequality with the white races null and void.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 38TH 
CONG., 2D SESS. 242 (1865); see also MALTZ, supra note 149, at 18. Likewise, Representative Holman 
worried that Section 2 ―confers on Congress the power to invade any State to enforce the freedom of 
the African[,] . . . [will elevate] the African to the august rights of citizenship[,] . . . [and will] strike 
down the corner-stone of the Republic, the local sovereignty of the States.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 38TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS. 2962 (1864). Representative Robert Mallory of Kentucky warned that Section 2 
would empower Congress to guarantee ―the freed negro the right of franchise.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 38TH 
CONG., 2D SESS. 180 (1865).  
 164. See VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 103. 
 165. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 553 (1864). 
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the Senate debates, he gave a lengthier statement in which he described 
Congress‘s power as that ―to pass such laws as may be necessary to carry 
[Section 1‘s ban on slavery and involuntary servitude] into effect.‖166 
Trumbull‘s use of the terms ―necessary‖ and ―proper‖ to describe the 
scope of Congress‘s Section 2 power to pass ―appropriate legislation‖ 
were almost certainly meant to allude to the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and Chief Justice John Marshall‘s famous explanation of Congress‘s broad 
enforcement powers in McCulloch v. Maryland.
167
  
After the Thirteenth Amendment passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, the states began their own ratification 
debates. Unsurprisingly, Section 2‘s grant of congressional power received 
more attention and concern in the states than it did in Congress. In the 
Union states, support for the Amendment was broad but not unanimous.
168
 
Some opponents of ratification articulated concerns about the scope of 
Congress‘s power under Section 2 and the risk it posed to the federal 
system.
169
 For example, in Ohio and Indiana, detractors claimed that 
Congress would use its Section 2 power to ―rewrite state constitutions or 
abolish state courts and state legislatures.‖170 In Michigan, one state 
senator warned against giving the federal government ―a despotic power 
that will most assuredly, ultimately eat out the vitals of the States.‖171 An 
Illinois state senator warned that congressional enforcement would 
―emasculate‖ the states.172 The Kentucky legislature, motivated by 
concerns that Congress might be empowered to overturn discriminatory 
state laws, considered a resolution that would have rejected Section 2 
 
 
 166. Id. at 1313. 
 167. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text 
(describing McCulloch‘s holding). This connection between the Thirteenth Amendment‘s enforcement 
clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause would be made explicitly during the congressional 
debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as in early judicial decisions regarding the scope of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. See infra notes 199, 251–252 and accompanying text; see also CONG. 
GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 214 (1865) (Rep. White) (noting that Section 2 conferred upon 
Congress ―the plenary power to pass all necessary enactments to enforce this provision of the 
Constitution‖). 
 168. In New York, for example, the Democratic legislative minority managed to block ratification. 
However, after President Lincoln was assassinated, the political climate changed and the New York 
legislature quickly ratified the Amendment. See VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 214.  
 169. See id. at 218. 
 170. Id. at 218 (citing CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1865, at 1; CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 11, 
1865, at 2; BREVIER LEGISLATIVE REPORTS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 212 (Cyrus L. Dunham)). 
 171. Id. at 218 (citing PROTEST OF THE HON. LOREN L. TREAT, SENATE DOC. NO. 38, DOCUMENTS 
ACCOMPANYING THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN AT THE BIENNIAL 
SESSION OF 1865, at 4). 
 172. Id. (citing Hon. William H. Green, Speech on the Proposed Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution Abolishing Slavery 9 (1865)). 
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entirely.
173
 Ultimately, however, Kentucky simply voted against 
ratification, joining Delaware as one of only two Union states to do so.
174
  
The states of the former Confederacy—with the exception of 
Mississippi—joined in ratifying the Amendment. However, those states 
consistently echoed a single, major concern: the scope of Section 2‘s 
enforcement power and its potential to subject states to federal control. As 
one Mississippi delegate explained,: ―‗The [second] section gives to 
Congress broad, and almost, I may say, unlimited power. . . . I am not 
willing to trust to men who know nothing of slavery the power to frame a 
code for the freedmen of the State of Mississippi.‘‖175 Accordingly, the 
Mississippi legislature rejected ratification, publishing a report that stated 
in part that Section Two was ―‗a dangerous grant of power . . . which, by 
construction, might admit federal legislation in respect to persons, 
denizens and inhabitants of the state.‘‖176 
In the course of South Carolina‘s debates, the provisional governor 
explained the state delegates‘ ―fear that the second section may be 
construed to give Congress power of local legislation over the Negroes, 
and white men, too, after the abolishment of slavery.‖177 To this concern, 
Secretary of State William Seward responded that Section 2 ―‗is really 
restraining in its effect, instead of enlarging the powers of Congress.‘‖178 
Seward‘s message assuaged these concerns sufficiently to garner South 
Carolina‘s ratification. However, South Carolina issued a declaration with 
its ratification, stating that ―‗any attempt by Congress toward legislating 
upon the political status of former slaves, or their civil relations, would be 
contrary to the Constitution of the United States as it now is, or as it would 
be altered by the proposed amendment.‘‖179 Alabama and Louisiana issued 
 
 
 173. Id. at 217–18 (citing S. JOURNAL, at 390–91 (Ky. 1863–64). 
 174. See id. at 216–17. Delaware and Kentucky ultimately ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 
February 1901 and March 1976, respectively. New Jersey initially blocked ratification, but ratified the 
Amendment in 1866 after it had been declared as officially adopted. See id. at 232 n.61. 
 175. Id. at 228 & n.50 (quoting Journal of the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1865, as 
cited in Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
9 NAT‘L B.J. 26, 33 (1951)). 
 176. Id. at 230 (citing REPORT OF THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE [OF MISSISSIPPI] ON STATE 
AND FEDERAL RELATIONS). Mississippi ultimately ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in March 1995. 
See infra note 344. 
 177. TSESIS, supra note 27, at 48. 
 178. VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 229 (quoting MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-26, at 254 (1966). In response to Seward‘s claim, indignant former 
general Ben Butler wrote to Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, suggesting that Congress should pass a 
broad civil rights bill ―so that hereafter no sophistry can claim that the word ‗appropriate‘ is a 
restrained word.‖ Id. (citing Letter from Gen. Butler to Rep. Stevens (Nov. 20, 1865) (Library of 
Congress, Thaddeus Stevens MSS)). 
 179. Id. at 230 (citing 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
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similar reservations as they ratified the Amendment.
180
 On December 18, 
1865, Secretary of State Seward issued a proclamation declaring that the 
Amendment had been ratified by the requisite number of states (twenty-
seven) and was thus adopted as part of the Constitution.
181
  
2. Debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
Even as they were debating the Thirteenth Amendment, both 
Mississippi and South Carolina enacted ―Black Codes‖—laws that 
restricted the freed slaves in their exercise of contractual and civil rights. 
For example, the codes required the freedmen to make annual written 
contracts for their labor and provided that they would be subject to arrest 
and forfeiture of the entirety of their annual wages if they left before the 
contract‘s term.182 Vagrancy laws were strengthened in an effort to ensure 
that freedmen agreed to such contractual provisions; those who lacked a 
―home and support‖ were subject to arrest and enforced service to pay 
their debts.
183
 By the end of 1866, all southern states had enacted such 
codes.
184
 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress convened on December 4, 1865 and, on 
January 5, 1866—shortly after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified by 
the states—began considering a civil rights measure that took direct aim at 
the southern Black Codes. Senator Lyman Trumbull, chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, proposed the act, entitled ―An Act To protect all 
Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the means of 
their vindication.‖185 The bill was eventually enacted as the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. As passed, Section 1 of the Act provided that: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to 
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
 
 
OF AMERICA 606 (1894)). 
 180. See HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 159 (1976); see also 2 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 610 (noting that Alabama 
ratified the Amendment on the ―understanding that it does not confer upon Congress the power to 
Legislate upon the political status of Freedmen in this State.‖). Florida and Mississippi also issued 
similar reservations, although their ratification votes came after December 18, 1865. 
 181. See VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 233. 
 182. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 39 (1866) (Rep. Wilson reporting on black codes 
in South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia). 
 183. See id. 
 184. VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 230. 
 185. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 129 (1866). 
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involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.
186
 
The second section of the Act declared that anyone who, acting under 
color of law, deprived a person of rights secured by the first section was 
guilty of a misdemeanor.
187
 The third section vested jurisdiction over such 
misdemeanors in the U.S. district courts and provided concurrent 
jurisdiction over state court cases involving persons who were unable to 
enforce in state court the rights guaranteed by the first section.
188
 
The Civil Rights Act was proposed and defended as an exercise of 
Congress‘s Section 2 power, and the debates over the Act contain a much 
more thoughtful reflection on the scope of that power than do the 
ratification debates. In a departure from the position taken during the 
congressional ratification debates, supporters saw the Act not as an 
articulation of the rights guaranteed directly by Section 1, but rather as a 
clear example of necessary and proper legislation to secure the freedom 
conveyed by Section 1. Opponents took the view that the sole effect of 
Section 1 was the abolition of slavery and, therefore, that the only 
appropriate laws for Section 2 purposes were those that punished physical 
enslavement. 
Senator Trumbull was the leading proponent of the bill and of an 
expansive reading of Congress‘s Section 2 power. Three weeks before he 
introduced the bill, Trumbull was asked about the purpose of Section 2
189
 
and admitted that he might not have made it clear in the course of the 
 
 
 186. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981–1982 (2006)). 
 187. See id. § 2. 
 188. See id. § 3. The latter sections of the Act, not Section 1, were the source of most debate and 
controversy in Congress. See BELZ, supra note 180, at 162. 
 189. Senator Saulsbury asked Senator Trumbull about the scope of Section 2, invoking Secretary 
of State Seward‘s claim that Section 2 was meant to be ―restraining‖ in its effect upon Congress. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 43 (1866); see also supra note 178 and accompanying text 
(recounting Seward‘s claim). 
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debates over the Thirteenth Amendment.
190
 In response, he explained that 
―Congress would have had the power, even without the second clause, to 
pass all laws necessary to give effect to the provision making all persons 
free.‖191 However, Section 2 ―was intended to put it beyond cavil and 
dispute‖ that Congress, in fact, had such a power.192 Noting that certain 
rights are inherent in the freedom granted by Section 1, Trumbull argued 
that Congress would have power under Section 2 to pass legislation to 
ensure that the freed slaves would have ―the privilege to go and come 
when they please, to buy and sell when they please, to make contracts and 
enforce contracts.‖193 Even more, Trumbull added, what is ―appropriate 
legislation‖ for Section 2 purposes ―is for Congress to determine, and 
nobody else.‖194 
After he introduced the bill, Senator Trumbull continued to emphasize 
a broad view of Congress‘s Section 2 power. Alluding to the slave codes 
and Black Codes, he explained that ―laws that prevented the colored man 
going from home, that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make 
contracts; that did not allow him to own property; that did not allow him to 
enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all badges of 
servitude.‖195 Trumbull argued that Section 2 gave Congress the power to 
―destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man.‖196 
He reiterated: ―Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? 
The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such 
appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to 
accomplish the end.‖197 
 
 
 190. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 43 (1865). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 322; see also id. at 322–23 (―With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the 
destruction of the incidents to slavery. . . [and] [w]ith the abolition of slavery should go all the badges 
of servitude which have been enacted for its maintenance and support.‖); id. at 474 (noting that any 
law that denied civil rights to people on the basis of color is ―a badge of servitude which, by the 
Constitution, is prohibited‖). For a description of the origins and meaning of the terms ―badges‖ and 
―incidents‖ of slavery, see infra Part II.C. 
 196. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322 (1866). Trumbull made clear that the bill was not 
intended to reach ―political rights.‖ See id. at 476. Rather, he defined ―civil rights‖ as natural rights 
and invoked the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in an effort to give content to those 
rights. See id. at 475. 
 197. Id. at 322; see also id. at 475 (―Then, under the constitutional amendment which we have 
now adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and which authorizes Congress by 
appropriate legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we have a right to pass any law 
which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in view, secure 
freedom to all people in the United States.‖). 
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In the House debates, Representative James Wilson of Iowa aligned 
himself with Trumbull‘s views. He pointed to Section 2 as the express 
source of Congress‘s power to pass the Act,198 invoking McCulloch v. 
Maryland and noting that the legitimate end of the bill ―is the maintenance 
of freedom to the citizen.‖199 The bill‘s means are appropriate to the end 
because ―[a] man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot 
be reduced to slavery.‖200 Indeed, ―[o]f the necessity of the measure 
Congress is the sole judge.‖201 Wilson also defended the power of 
Congress as ―necessarily implied from the entire body of the 
Constitution.‖202 He characterized the rights conveyed by the Act as only 
―those rights which belong to men as citizens of the United States‖203 and 
cited Prigg v. Pennsylvania
204
 for the proposition that ―[t]he possession of 
the rights by the citizen raises by implication the power in Congress to 
provide appropriate means for their protection; in other words, to supply 
the needed remedy.‖205  
Thus, Trumbull and Wilson focused less on Section 1 of the 
Amendment—which, in their view, provided only freedom from slavery—
and more on Section 2 and the power of Congress to ensure that freedom 
by eradicating the Black Codes and protecting certain civil rights.
206
 They 
were joined in this approach by Representative Burton Cook of Illinois 
and Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan.
207
 According to Cook, Section 1 
 
 
 198. See id. at 1118; see also id. at H. App. 157. 
 199. Id. at 1118.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at H. App. 157. 
 203. Id. at 1294. An early draft of the Civil Rights Act contained an additional provision barring 
―discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United States.‖ Id. at 1296 (motion 
to remove that provision). This provision spurred heated debate, see, e.g., id. at 1294 (Rep. Wilson) 
(denying that the Act would extend federal jurisdiction over ―the school laws and jury laws and 
franchise laws of the States‖), and occasioned the most intense discussion regarding the enforcement 
power of Congress. 
 204. 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 205. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1294 (1866). At least one commentator views 
Wilson‘s reference to Prigg as a tacit acknowledgment that the Section 2 power was insufficient to 
support the Civil Rights Act. See ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS‘ DEBATES, at 
x (1967). 
 206. As Trumbull put it, ―[l]iberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the other.‖ 
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866). 
 207. Senator John Sherman of Ohio argued for this approach even before the introduction of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. On December 13, 1865, while debating a proposal to nullify southern Black 
Codes, Sherman argued that Section 2 expressly gave Congress the power ―to secure all their rights of 
freedom by appropriate legislation.‖ Id. at 41. ―Now unless a man may be free without the right to sue 
and be sued, to plead and be impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and to testify in a court of 
justice, then Congress has the power by the express terms of this amendment, to secure all these rights. 
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―prohibited forever the mere fact of chattel slavery as it existed,‖208 but 
Section 2 gave Congress ―power to secure the rights of freemen to those 
men who had been slaves‖ and set Congress as ―the judge of what is 
necessary for the purpose of securing to them those rights.‖209 In Cook‘s 
view, the civil rights bill was necessary legislation because persons denied 
the rights protected by the Act ―are not secured in the rights of 
freedom.‖210 Senator Howard likewise defended the proposed Act, 
claiming that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended ―to give to 
Congress precisely the power over the subject of slavery and the freedmen 
which is proposed to be exercised by the bill now under our 
consideration.‖211 
Opponents of the bill took issue with this broad interpretation of 
Section 2 and instead took the view articulated by Representative Anthony 
Thornton that ―[t]he sole object of [Section 1] was to change the status of 
the slave to that of a freeman; and the only power conferred upon 
Congress by the second section of that amendment is the power to enforce 
the freedom of those who have been thus emancipated.‖212 Opponents of 
the bill did not contest the idea that the Section 2 enforcement power was 
akin to the power of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
213
 
but rather took a very limited view of what would constitute appropriate 
legislation. For some, the only appropriate legislation would be that 
directly related to maintaining the former slaves‘ new status as freedmen. 
As Representative Samuel Marshall put it, ―Congress has acquired not a 
particle of additional power other than [the literal freeing of slaves] by 
virtue of this amendment.‖214 Senator Cowan found that Section 2 ―was 
intended . . . to give the Negro the privilege of the habeas corpus, that is, 
 
 
To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not able to assert and maintain his right, in a court of justice, 
is a negation of terms.‖ Id.  
 208. Id. at 1124. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 503; see also id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer) (―[B]y virtue of the second section of [the 
Thirteenth Amendment] Congress has express power to pass laws which will guaranty and insure these 
great rights and immunities of citizenship.‖). 
 212. Id. at 1156. 
 213. See id. at 576 (Sen. Davis) (agreeing that Section 2 essentially reiterated Congress‘s 
―necessary and proper‖ power). 
 214. Id. at 628; see also id. at 499 (Rep. Cowan) (stating that Section 2 empowered Congress only 
to break ―the bond by which the negro slave was held to his master‖); id. at 1123 (Rep. Rogers) 
(arguing that Section 2 ―enable[s] Congress to lay the hand of Federal power, delegated by the States 
to the General Government, upon the States to prevent them from re-enslaving the blacks which it 
could not do before the adoption of this amendment to the Constitution‖); id. at 1268 (Rep. Kerr) (―I 
hold that [Section 2] gives no power to Congress to enact any such law as this or any other law, except 
such only as is necessary to prevent the reestablishment of slavery.‖). 
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if anybody persisted in the face of the constitutional amendment in holding 
him as a slave, that he should have an appropriate remedy to be 
delivered.‖215  
At least two of the Act‘s opponents took a somewhat broader view of 
appropriate legislation. Representative Thornton acknowledged that 
―Congress has the power to punish any man who deprives a slave of the 
right of contract, or the right to control and recover his wages,‖ but denied 
the power to legislate on any subjects beyond that.
216
 Representative 
Columbus Delano conceded that Section 2 gave Congress the power to 
legislate regarding the ―necessar[y] incident[s] to freedom,‖217 but took a 
narrow view of that category, doubting that anyone could believe ―that the 
right to testify or to inherit is a necessary condition of freedom.‖218  
All opponents, however, agreed that protecting the rights listed in the 
Civil Rights Act went beyond what was appropriate. In the words of 
Senator Willard Saulsbury,  
[t]he attempt now under the power given, which relates simply and 
solely to one subject-matter, the abolition of the status or condition 
of slavery, to confer civil rights which are wholly distinct and 
unconnected with the status or condition of slavery, is an attempt 
unwarranted by any method or process of sound reasoning.
219
 
According to Representative Michael Kerr, the bestowal of ―civil 
privileges having no necessary connection with . . . personal freedom‖ is 
―wholly unauthorized,‖220 and the expansive view of the Section 2 power 
taken by the Act‘s supporters would allow Congress to ―revolutionize all 
the laws of the states everywhere.‖221  
On February 2, 1866, the Senate voted in favor of the bill by a vote of 
33 to 12, with five abstentions. The House of Representatives approved 
the bill on March 13, by a vote of 111 to 38, with thirty-four 
abstentions.
222
 However, on March 27, 1866, President Andrew Johnson 
 
 
 215. Id. at 499. 
 216. Id. at 1156. 
 217. Id. at H. App. 158 (Rep. Delano). Delano eventually voted in favor of the Civil Rights Act, 
but all of his statements argue against it. See id. at 1367, 1861. 
 218. Id. at H. App. 158. 
 219. Id. at 476. 
 220. Id. at 623. 
 221. Id.; see also id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr) (―The anti-slavery amendment of the Constitution had 
one very simple object to accomplish when gentlemen on the other side of this House desired to secure 
its adoption; but now it is confidently appealed to as authority for this bill and almost every other 
radical and revolutionary measure . . . .‖).  
 222. See id. at 1367. 
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vetoed the Act. Drawing on the views of the Act‘s opponents, Johnson 
stated that ―[i]t cannot . . . be justly claimed that, with a view to the 
enforcement of [Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment], there is at 
present any necessity for the exercise of all the powers which this bill 
confers.‖223 He also objected to the bill on federalism grounds, claiming 
that Congress had legislated with respect to rights that had been 
―considered as exclusively belonging to the States . . . [relating] to [their] 
internal police and economy.‖224 Johnson argued that if Congress could 
properly legislate on those topics, it could also ―repeal . . . all State laws 
discriminating between the two races on the subjects of suffrage and 
office‖ or declare who had the right to vote.225 
The Senate and House debates after the veto broke no new ground. 
Senator Trumbull again maintained that the civil rights protected by the 
Act are ―those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens 
or free men in all countries,‖226 such as ―‗the right of personal security, the 
right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.‘‖227 
In his view, Section 2 empowered Congress ―to do whatever is necessary 
to protect the freedman in his liberty.‖228 Senator Cowan countered that 
the liberty granted to the former slaves was merely ―[t]he right to go 
wherever one pleases without restraint or hinderance on the part of any 
other person.‖229 Because the Civil Rights Act extended protection to ―free 
negroes and mulattoes‖ and not just the freed slaves, Cowan argued, it 
went well beyond congressional power under Section 2.
230
  
Ultimately, Congress overrode Johnson‘s veto. On April 6, 1866, the 
Senate voted 33–15 to override the veto, with one abstention,231 and on 
April 9, the House of Representatives approved an override by a vote of 
122–41, with twenty-one abstentions.232  
 
 
 223. Id. at 1681. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1757. 
 227. Id. (quoting JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 38 (1826)). Trumbull 
juxtaposed these ―civil rights‖ with ―political privileges‖ like voting and holding office, on which the 
law would have no bearing. See id. 
 228. Id. at 1759.  
 229. Id. at 1784. Cowan again indicated that ―appropriate‖ legislation would be a law providing 
the writ of habeas corpus and a cause of action for damages for an African American who was 
unlawfully restrained or kidnapped. Id.; cf. supra text accompanying note 215. 
 230. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1784 (1866).  
 231. Id. at 1809. 
 232. Id. at 1861.  
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3. Debates Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment 
Perhaps the most influential opponent of the Civil Rights Act was 
Representative John Bingham of Ohio. According to Bingham, the Civil 
Rights Act proposed ―[t]o reform the whole civil and criminal code of 
every State government by declaring that there shall be no discrimination 
between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in the 
penalties prescribed by their laws.‖233 Bingham, in fact, supported this 
objective,
234
 but believed that Section 2 was an insufficient source of 
congressional power to accomplish it. In his view, the Act violated the 
residual power of the states under the Tenth Amendment to punish 
offenses against the life, liberty, and property of citizens.
235
 Therefore, he 
thought that another constitutional amendment would be necessary to 
displace discriminatory state laws.
236
  
Bingham introduced what would become the Fourteenth Amendment 
just before the Civil Rights Act was introduced by Trumbull.
237
 As the 
debates on both proceeded, it became clear that, in Bingham‘s view, the 
proposed Amendment would provide surer constitutional footing for the 
rights conveyed by the Act. Although the Fourteenth Amendment debates 
did not occasion further substantial reflection on Congress‘s Section 2 
power, they did provide some insight as to the unease of the Act‘s 
supporters and opponents alike as to the Act‘s constitutionality. For 
example, Senator Luke Poland, who voted for the Civil Rights Act, noted 
that ―[t]he power of Congress to [pass the Act] has been doubted and 
denied by persons entitled to high consideration. It certainly seems 
desirable that no doubt should be left existing as to the power of Congress 
to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all republican 
government . . . .‖238 Representative Henry Raymond, who voted against 
the Civil Rights Act, noted that he ―regarded it as very doubtful, to say the 
least, whether Congress, under the existing Constitution, had any power to 
enact such a law; and [he] thought . . . that very many members who voted 
for the bill also doubted the power of Congress to pass it . . . .‖239 Indeed, 
 
 
 233. Id. at 1293. 
 234. See id. at 1291. 
 235. Id.; see also id. at 504–05 (Sen. Johnson). 
 236. See id. at 1291–93. 
 237. See MALTZ, supra note 149, at 54. 
 238. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2961 (1866).  
 239. Id. at 2502. Certainly, not all who voted for the Act had doubts as to Congress‘s power. See, 
e.g., id. at 3035 (Sen. Henderson) (―I never doubted the power of Congress to pass [the Act]. I never 
doubted that the Government would be disgraced if it failed to establish for the private citizen the 
muniments of freedom intended to be secured by them.‖). 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted in 1870 after the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
240
 
Overall, it is difficult to know how much the debates over the Civil 
Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment should inform our inquiry into the 
original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. As a general matter, the 
original meaning of legislation is usually to be discerned only from 
contemporaneous debates, not conduct and statements that postdate 
enactment.
241
 In this particular context, the enactment of the southern 
Black Codes between the ratification of the Amendment and the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act at least suggests that the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
might have had an enhanced view compared to that of the Thirty-Eighth 
Congress as to what type of legislation might be ―appropriate‖ to enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment.
242
 At the very least, the swift proposal and 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, followed by the reenactment of the 
Civil Rights Act, suggests a level of uncertainty as to whether Section 2, in 
particular, provided sufficient power for Congress to enact the Act. 
On the other hand, enactment of enforcement legislation immediately 
in the wake of the ratification of a new constitutional amendment is a rare 
event that might well shed light on the scope of the enforcement power. 
Indeed, even after a presidential veto, the Act received the support of two-
thirds of both the Senate and the House.
243
 An important parallel exists in 
the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, an act that is generally regarded 
as shedding light on the meaning of Article III.
244
 The debates over the 
 
 
 240. See An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States 
of this Union, and for other Purposes, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 
 241. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 626–27 (2004) (―[W]e have said repeatedly that ‗subsequent 
legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from 
its language and legislative history prior to its enactment.‘‖ (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 n.5 (2001))); cf. Colker, supra note 119, at 790 
(―We should rarely look at statements made after the ratification of a Constitutional provision. The 
important temporal period is the moment (or the immediate moment before) the ratification of 
constitutional language.‖); Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary 
Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 131 (2000) (―[Probative legislative 
history] excludes any post enactment declarations by either the executive or legislators. Such 
statements are not subject to legislative deliberation and are not relevant. Additionally such statements 
almost always reflect the speaker‘s current political needs and not those of the enacting legislature.‖). 
 242. Professor David Currie has criticized those who would turn to the debates over the Civil 
Rights Act to discern the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, noting that the Act‘s supporters 
―made no such [expansive] claim[s] when there was still time to vote [the Thirteenth Amendment] 
down.‖ DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 
1789–1888, at 400–01 (1985). Indeed, Currie calls this ―the Trojan Horse theory of constitutional 
adjudication.‖ Id. at 401. 
 243. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 244. ―Just as the Judiciary Act of 1789 is considered a guide to the meaning of Article III, the 
1866 Act can guide interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.‖ Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, 
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Civil Rights Act involved many of the same legislators who voted upon 
the Amendment itself, and their comments are illuminating with respect to 
their own understandings of the extent of Congress‘s Section 2 power—
perhaps as intended originally, and at least as that power was reconceived 
in light of the intervening year‘s events, particularly the passage of the 
Black Codes.
245
  
Ultimately, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions from the 
historical record as to the precise meaning of Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
246
 However, the rough parameters of the debate do emerge: 
For some, the Amendment guaranteed the end of slavery but no more. For 
others, it was a promise of affirmative freedom and a grant of 
congressional power to secure a limited set of civil rights deemed essential 
to that freedom. While there was general agreement that Congress would 
have broad discretion, in the mold of McCulloch and Prigg, to determine 
the means by which the Amendment‘s substantive guarantee would be 
enforced, there was no suggestion that Section 2 granted Congress any 
substantive power to define or expand its own vision of the Amendment‘s 
ends. 
 
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
999, 1044 (2008) (citations omitted); cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (interpreting original 
meaning of Copyright Clause in part by looking to the first federal copyright statute passed by the First 
Congress); VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 236 (noting that the Republican members of the Judiciary 
Committee made broad claims about the purpose of the Amendment that they had not made during the 
actual debates on the Amendment); id. at 237 (―In 1864 Trumbull did not foresee the need for specific 
civil rights legislation, and therefore he was mute on the question of enforcement. But . . . the 
appearance of black codes in the South made him better appreciate and articulate the potential of the 
enforcement clause.‖). 
 245. Professor Akhil Amar has suggested that the passage of the Civil Rights Act just one year 
after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and just before the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment indicates that Congress took a broad view of its Section 2 power, and thus of the meaning 
of enforcement clauses generally. Amar argues that the Civil Rights Act was ―broad substantive 
legislation ranging far beyond the self-executing rights under Section 1,‖ and by passing such a law 
―[a]t the very moment that they were proposing another ‗enforcement‘ clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, [Congress spoke] loud and clear about what the parallel enforcement clause of the 
Thirteenth Amendment meant. And they said it meant more than mere remedial legislation.‖ Amar, 
supra note 25, at 823. Accordingly, in Amar‘s view, City of Boerne‘s inflexible remedial-only 
standard should yield to a more moderate standard, and Jones should remain untouched. See id. at 
824–25. 
 246. ―The quest to determine which interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment is most credible 
or most authoritative is endless and, to a certain extent, pointless, for the measure never had a single, 
fixed meaning.‖ VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 237; see also id. at 249–50 (noting that it is not fair to 
assume that there was an original understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment because ―[p]eople of 
the time were easily distracted from the Amendment by other legislation, by elections, and most 
importantly, by the Civil War. Their attitudes toward the Amendment were never steady; they evolved 
in relation and in reaction to very different sorts of measures and events.‖). 
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B. Judicial Approaches to the Section 2 Power 
Whatever doubts members of Congress had about the constitutionality 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the federal courts uniformly have regarded 
it as the paradigm of ―appropriate‖ Section 2 legislation. Generally, courts 
have taken a broad view of Congress‘s power to choose the means by 
which the Thirteenth Amendment‘s promise will be implemented, but a 
much more limited view of the appropriate ends of Thirteenth Amendment 
legislation. Although Jones‘s approval of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was 
unsurprising in this respect,
247
 its permissive and deferential approach to 
future congressional attempts to substantively define the badges and 
incidents of slavery was a departure from earlier case law. This section 
traces how the federal courts have approached the scope of Congress‘s 
Section 2 power from the Reconstruction era through the modern era.  
The first two attempts to assess the scope of Congress‘s enforcement 
power came from Supreme Court Justices sitting as Circuit Justices. 
United States v. Rhodes
248
 came quickly on the heels of the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Two white men had burglarized the home of 
Nancy Talbot, an African American, and were prosecuted in federal court 
under the third section of the newly passed Act
249
 on the ground that 
Kentucky courts would have forbidden Talbot—but not a white citizen—
from testifying against them.
250
 They challenged their convictions, 
claiming in part that the 1866 Act was beyond the power of Congress to 
enact.  
Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as a Circuit Justice, 
rejected that challenge. He invoked McCulloch v. Maryland as his guide 
for interpreting Section 2.
251
 In his view, McCulloch‘s broad view of 
congressional enforcement powers showed ―the spirit in which the 
Amendment is to be interpreted, and develop[ed] fully the principles to be 
 
 
 247. But see George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1390–91 (2008) (noting that Jones contradicted the Civil Rights Cases with respect 
to whether acts of private racial discrimination constituted a badge or incident of slavery). 
 248. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). 
 249. Section 3 gave federal courts jurisdiction over ―all causes, civil and criminal, affecting 
persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality 
where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act.‖ Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The first section of the Act gave all persons ―the same right in 
every State and Territory in the United States . . . to sue, be parties, and give evidence . . . as is enjoyed 
by white citizens.‖ Id. § 1. 
 250. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 785–86. 
 251. Id. at 791. 
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applied.‖252 He found that while the first section of the Thirteenth 
Amendment ―abolish[es] slavery . . . and guards . . . against the recurrence 
of the evil,‖253 the second section 
authorizes congress to select, from time to time, the means that 
might be deemed appropriate to the end. It employs a phrase which 
had been enlightened by well-considered judicial application. Any 
exercise of legislative power within its limits involves a legislative, 
and not a judicial question. It is only when the authority given has 
been clearly exceeded, that the judicial power can be invoked.
254
 
 Noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed in close 
proximity to the ratification of the Amendment by many of the same 
members of Congress who had voted for the Amendment,
255
 Justice 
Swayne upheld the Act in its entirety: 
[W]ho will say it is not an ―appropriate‖ means of carrying out the 
object of the first section of the Amendment, and a necessary and 
proper execution of the power conferred by the second? Blot out 
this act and deny the constitutional power to pass it, and the worst 
effects of slavery might speedily follow. It would be a virtual 
abrogation of the Amendment.
256
 
Swayne thus appeared to regard the constitutional ―end‖ as the prevention 
of slavery itself, and the means employed by Congress in the Act as 
sufficiently effective in advancing that goal. 
Justice Joseph Bradley took a similar view of the constitutional ends 
but, for the first time, articulated boundaries as to the permissible means of 
Section 2 legislation. Sitting as a Circuit Justice in United States v. 
Cruikshank,
257
 he sustained a challenge to the Enforcement Act of 1870, 
 
 
 252. Id. at 792. In addition to McCulloch, Justice Swayne also cited Justice Joseph Story‘s 
Commentaries on the Constitution as a guide. See id. at 791–92 (―Judge Story says: ‗In the practical 
application of government, then, the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers 
with which the people, by the constitution and laws, have entrusted them. They must have a wide 
discretion as to the choice of means; and the only limitation upon the discretion would seem to be that 
the means are appropriate to the end; and this must admit of considerable latitude . . . . If the end be 
legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all the means which are appropriate, and which are 
plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may be constitutionally employed to carry it 
into effect.‘‖) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 432 (1833)). 
 253. Id. at 793. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 794. 
 256. Id.  
 257. 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 18,497), aff’d on other grounds 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
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which penalized conspiracies to hinder the ―free exercise and enjoyment of 
any right or privilege granted or secured to [any citizen, regardless of 
color] by the constitution or laws of the United States.‖258 Justice Bradley 
stated that Section 2 gave Congress ―the power not only to legislate for the 
eradication of slavery, but the power to give full effect to this bestowment 
of liberty on these millions of people.‖259 He cited the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 as appropriate Section 2 legislation because ―disability to be a citizen 
and enjoy equal rights was deemed one form or badge of servitude,‖ and 
because the Act ―place[d] the other races on the same plane of privilege as 
that occupied by the white race.‖260 The Enforcement Act, however, was 
beyond Congress‘s Section 2 power because it did not require that the 
victim‘s ―race, color, or previous condition of servitude‖ be the motivating 
factor for charged conspiracy.
261
 Thus, in Justice Bradley‘s view, 
Congress‘s Section 2 power was broad in the sense that it enabled 
Congress to pass civil rights laws to eradicate the badges of slavery, but 
limited in the sense that it enabled Congress to protect only those targeted 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
The Supreme Court, as a whole, first considered the scope of 
Congress‘s Section 2 power in 1883 in United States v. Harris,262 adopting 
Justice Bradley‘s Cruikshank approach. Harris concerned the 
constitutionality of section 2 of the Civil Rights (Ku Klux Klan) Act of 
1871, which provided criminal penalties for conspiracies to deprive ―any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges or immunities under the laws.‖263 The Court held that the Act 
was beyond Congress‘s power under any of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. With respect to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court began 
by stating that  
[i]t is clear that [the] amendment, besides abolishing forever slavery 
and involuntary servitude within the United States, gives power to 
Congress to protect all persons . . . from being in any way subjected 
 
 
 258. An Act To enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of 
this Union, and for other Purposes, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870). 
 259. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 711. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at 713–14. 
 262. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 263. An Act To enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for other Purposes, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13–14 (1871). The same language is 
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006). The Supreme Court upheld the statute against 
Thirteenth Amendment challenge in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), distinguishing Harris 
because Harris followed a now-discarded view that overbroad statutes should be invalidated in their 
entirety rather than treated as severable. 
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to slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime, and in the enjoyment of that freedom which it was the object 
of the Amendment to secure.
264
 
The Court pointed approvingly to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
suggesting that the Act was a clear example of permissible enforcement 
legislation.
265
 However, because the Ku Klux Klan Act on its face covered 
conspiracies against white people or persons who were never enslaved, the 
Court concluded that the Act ―clearly cannot be authorized by the 
Amendment which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.‖266  
Ten months after Harris, in the Civil Rights Cases,
267
 the Court 
continued to point to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as the paradigm of 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. In that decision, the Court 
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
268
 which had guaranteed ―the 
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and 
other places of public amusement,‖269 regardless of race. In addition to its 
famous holding that the Fourteenth Amendment governs only state, not 
private, action, the Court also held that Congress lacked power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to pass the law.
270
  
Justice Bradley wrote the majority opinion and, consistent with his 
view in Cruikshank, asserted that Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
not only ―abolished slavery‖ but also ―establish[ed] . . . universal civil and 
political freedom throughout the United States.‖271 Although he endorsed 
the McCulloch view that Section 2 ―clothes Congress with power to pass 
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of 
slavery in the United States,‖272 he again took a limited view of the badges 
and incidents of slavery that Congress could address. He defined the 
―necessary incidents‖ of slavery—those that ―constitut[ed] its substance 
and visible form‖—as including compulsory service; restraint of 
movement; and ―disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a 
standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like 
 
 
 264. Harris, 106 U.S. at 640. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 646.  
 267. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 268. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 269. Id. 
 270. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
 271. Id. at 20. 
 272. Id.; see also id. at 21 (stating that under Section 2, Congress has ―a right to enact all 
necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery‖). 
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burdens and incapacities.‖273 However, ―[m]ere discriminations on account 
of race or color,‖ such as denials of admission to public accommodations 
on the basis of race, were not ―badges of slavery.‖274 Indeed,  
[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make 
it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will 
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre 
. . . .
275
  
Thus, the majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases indicated that the 
judiciary would defer to congressional determinations as to the proper 
means of enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment, but would be less 
deferential to congressional efforts to define the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery,‖ i.e., the ―ends‖ of the Amendment itself. Although the Court 
invoked McCulloch‘s permissive standard, it concluded that Congress had 
acted impermissibly and irrationally by passing the Civil Rights Act of 
1875. 
Justice Harlan dissented, chiding the majority for its lack of true 
deference to Congress‘s judgment.276 He juxtaposed the majority opinion 
with McCulloch and Prigg, and argued that the inclusion of Section 2 in 
the Thirteenth Amendment represented a conscious choice to empower 
Congress to protect ―freedom and the rights necessarily inhering in a state 
of freedom.‖277 Thus, in Harlan‘s view, Section 2 empowers Congress ―to 
protect [freed slaves] against the deprivation, because of their race, of any 
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State.‖278 Because public 
conveyances, inns, and places of public amusement are all public or quasi-
public in nature,
279
 Justice Harlan concluded that ―discrimination practised 
by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-
public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress 
 
 
 273. Id. at 22. 
 274. Id. at 25. 
 275. Id. at 24. Similarly, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1896), the Court rejected a 
claim that a Louisiana law that required African Americans to occupy ―equal but separate‖ railroad 
cars violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 276. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 28–30, 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 277. Id. at 34–35. 
 278. Id. at 36. Justice Harlan clarified that he did ―not contend that the Thirteenth Amendment 
invests Congress with authority, by legislation, to define and regulate the entire body of the civil rights 
which citizens enjoy, or may enjoy, in the several States.‖ Id. 
 279. See id. at 37–42. 
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may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment.‖280 
Thus, in the two decades following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, the Court and its members articulated a consistent view of the 
operation and boundaries of the Section 2 power: (1) Congress was 
empowered, not only to prevent and punish slavery and involuntary 
servitude, but also could seek to abolish the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery‖ by affirmatively protecting certain civil rights; (2) The ―badges 
and incidents‖ of slavery included race-based discrimination in state laws 
pertaining to contract rights, property rights, and recognition in court, but 
not race-based discrimination in privately operated public 
accommodations; (3) The Court actively evaluated whether legislation 
targeted the badges and incidents of slavery; and (4) The Court deferred to 
the means by which Congress chose to address the badges and incidents of 
slavery. 
Despite the Court‘s numerous approving references to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 in its early Thirteenth Amendment cases,
281
 the first time the 
Supreme Court as a whole had occasion to consider the constitutional 
basis for the Act was in Hodges v. United States.
282
 In a surprising move, 
the Court struck down the convictions of several white men who 
threatened and harasssed African American workers at a sawmill, and 
thereby denied the workers‘ right under the Act to make and enforce 
contracts without regard to race. The Court held that Congress lacked the 
power to pass the Act.
283
 The Court began by noting that the Thirteenth 
Amendment‘s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude was 
absolute and protected people of all races: ―[w]hile the inciting cause of 
the Amendment was the emancipation of the colored race, yet it is not an 
attempt to commit that race to the care of the Nation.‖284 The only 
 
 
 280. Id. at 43. Justice Harlan also dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson, arguing, in part, that ―[the 
Thirteenth Amendment] not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the 
United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of 
slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country.‖ 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In his view, ―[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a 
public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality 
before the law established by the Constitution.‖ Id. at 562. 
 281. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. 
 282. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). One year earlier, the Court had ―entertain[ed] no doubt‖ about Congress‘s 
power under Section 2 to ban peonage, defined as ―a status or condition of compulsory service, based 
upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.‖ Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–18 (1985) 
(upholding the Peonage Act of 1867, then codified at sections 1990 and 5526 of the Revised Code, and 
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 and 18 U.S.C. § 1581). 
 283. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 18–19. 
 284. Id. at 16. 
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protection Congress could extend under Section 2, however, was from the 
actual condition of slavery; the badges and incidents of slavery were not 
permissible topics of legislation.
285
 Thus, Congress had exceeded its power 
by attempting to regulate the performance of private contracts when, in 
fact, Section 2 limited it to regulating only conduct that actually enslaved a 
person: ―no mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation operates to 
reduce the individual to a condition of slavery.‖286  
Justice Harlan again dissented, calling the majority‘s conception of 
congressional power ―entirely too narrow‖287 and reiterating that under 
Section 2, ―Congress may not only prevent the reestablishing of the 
institution of slavery, pure and simple, but may make it impossible that 
any of its incidents or badges [including the disability to make valid 
contracts for one‘s services] should exist or be enforced in any State or 
Territory of the United States.‖288 Thus, the ruling in Hodges rejected forty 
years of jurisprudence and instead vindicated the view of the opponents of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, namely, that the only proper end of Section 2 
legislation was the destruction of the actual conditions of slavery and 
involuntary servitude.  
It was not until 1968, in Jones, that the Supreme Court again had 
occasion to consider the scope of Congress‘s Section 2 power. In 
upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a proper exercise of that power, 
Jones overruled Hodges, claiming that it ―rested upon a concept of 
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with 
. . . the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose 
 
 
 285. Id. at 19. This view prevailed on the Court until Jones overruled Hodges. See, e.g., Corrigan 
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction in case where defense claimed 
that enforcement of racially restrictive covenant would violate Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
because the Amendment reaches only ―condition[s] of enforced compulsory service of one to another, 
[and] does not in other matters protect the individual rights of persons of the negro race‖). 
 286. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 18; see also id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―The opinion of the court, 
it may be observed, does not, in words, adjudge [the Civil Rights Act of 1866] to be unconstitutional. 
But if its scope and effect are not wholly misapprehended by me, the court does adjudge that Congress 
cannot make it an offense against the United States for individuals to combine or conspire to prevent, 
even by force, citizens of African descent, solely because of their race, from earning a living.‖). 
 287. Id. at 37. 
 288. Id. at 27. Justice Harlan made clear that ―the disability to make valid contracts for one's 
services was . . . an inseparable incident of the institution of slavery which the Thirteenth Amendment 
destroyed; and as a combination or conspiracy to prevent citizens of African descent, solely because of 
their race, from making and performing such contracts, is thus in hostility to the rights and privileges 
that inhere in the freedom established by that Amendment.‖ Id. at 38. Harlan also stated that, aside 
from the scope of Section 2, Section 1 of the Amendment, ―by its own force[,] . . . destroyed slavery 
and all its incidents and badges.‖ Id. at 27; see also VORENBERG, supra note 28, at 240 (characterizing 
Hodges as dealing the Court‘s ―strongest blow against the [Thirteenth Amendment by declaring] that 
state courts were the exclusive arbiters of violations of the . . . Amendment‖). 
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of the Amendment itself.‖289 Thus, Jones squarely embraced the idea that 
the proper ends of Section 2 legislation include the eradication, not only of 
the actual conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude, but also of the 
badges and incidents of slavery. Notably, even though Jones invoked the 
Civil Rights Cases as support for this proposition, it went further than that 
case by holding that Congress could conclude that private acts of racial 
discrimination—as opposed to discriminatory public laws—were badges 
and incidents of slavery.
290
 Indeed, Jones arguably went further than any 
prior case by holding that Congress‘s determination of what constituted a 
badge and incident of slavery was subject only to rational basis review.
291
 
C. Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery 
As the above sections demonstrate, the concept of the ―badges and 
incidents of slavery‖ features prominently in the ratification, 
implementation, and judicial evaluation of Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Jones solidified the prominence of the concept, placing in 
Congress‘s hands the power to define the badges and incidents of slavery. 
Thus, it is important to probe what this phrase and its constituent terms 
likely meant to the members of Congress and the Justices who used them, 
and to understand how Congress might conceptualize them today.  
Professor George Rutherglen has studied the origins and meaning of 
the terms ―badges of slavery‖ and ―incidents of slavery‖ and found that 
they were used frequently, even before the Civil War.
292
 Of the two, 
―incidents of slavery‖ had a more firmly established legal meaning. It 
referred to the legal consequences of servitude—―the various disabilities 
imposed upon slaves in different southern states.‖293 This definition 
comports with the sense in which the term was used in the congressional 
debates regarding Section 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Senators 
Harlan and Trumbull, in particular, described the ―incidents‖ of slavery 
that would disappear by virtue of the Amendment: compulsory service, the 
inability to marry, interference with family relationships, the deprivation 
of education, the suppression of speech, the inability to acquire property, 
 
 
 289. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968). 
 290. See id. at 442–43. 
 291. See id. at 440. 
 292. Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 2–5. 
 293. Id. at 4 (citing GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE 
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1856)). 
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and the deprivation of any status in a court of law, either as a litigant or a 
witness.
294
 
The term ―badges of slavery,‖ although used in the antebellum period, 
had a less precise meaning. According to Rutherglen, a ―badge‖ of slavery 
was a characteristic indicative of slave status or political subjugation, 
rather than a legal consequence flowing from such a condition.
295
 The term 
was not used in the law of slavery, but was often used metaphorically in 
political discourse to describe a trait that was ―evidence of political 
subjugation.‖296 The term is sufficiently ambiguous that it permits a range 
of definitions. It is possible to understand the term narrowly, lacking 
―independent significance‖ and ―add[ing] only metaphorical connotations 
[to the phrase ―incidents of slavery‖] that [have] no operative legal 
effect.‖297 The term was not used at all in the ratification debates, and it 
appeared during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 only in 
Senator Trumbull‘s comments. The two times he used that phrase, 
Trumbull appeared to understand the term narrowly and in line with the 
incidents of slavery, defining a ―badge of servitude‖ as a law ―which 
deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens.‖298 
However, it is also possible to take a more expansive view of ―badges 
of slavery,‖ interpreting it as a reference to ―symbolic manifestations of 
political and social [racial] inferiority.‖299 Indeed, Justice Douglas 
endorsed such a broad understanding in his Jones concurrence, referring to 
the ―badges of slavery‖ that ―remain today.‖300 In his view, 
―discriminatory practices,‖ ranging from private efforts to promote 
segregation in housing, schools, and public accommodations, to public 
laws and customs resisting integration, reveal ―prejudices, once part and 
parcel of slavery‖301 and ―a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die.‖302 
 
 
 294. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1439 (1864) (Sen. Harlan) (listing them as 
―[s]ome of the incidents of slavery‖); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322–23 (1865) 
(Sen. Trumbull). Trumbull also used the term ―badges of slavery‖ to describe the same types of legal 
restrictions. See id. at 474. 
 295. See Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 5–6.  
 296. Id. at 4.  
 297. Id. at 3. 
 298. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 322–23, 474 (1866). 
 299. Rutherglen, supra note 247, at 1368; see also Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 2, 15 
(describing the ―badges‖ of slavery as the ―social consequences of race,‖ including race 
discrimination). 
 300. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 301. Id. at 449. 
 302. Id. at 445. 
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The phrase ―badges and incidents of slavery‖ entered Thirteenth 
Amendment parlance in the Civil Rights Cases,
303
 and ―quickly became 
the Supreme Court‘s standard gloss upon the powers of Congress under 
the Thirteenth Amendment.‖304 The Civil Rights Cases majority used the 
term to describe the permissible subjects of Thirteenth Amendment 
legislation, while at the same time giving it a limited construction, barring 
Congress from legislating against private, commercial acts of racial 
prejudice.
305
 In a single stroke, ―this phrase became authoritative . . . [and] 
also lost its expansive implications‖ for almost a century.306  
In Jones, the Court retained the ―badges and incidents‖ framework but 
conceptualized it in a much broader way, sanctioning Congress‘s decision 
to treat private, commercial racial discrimination as a badge and incident 
of slavery.
307
 Moreover, Jones gave Congress wide-ranging discretion to 
define the term in future debates subject only to rational basis review in 
the courts.
308
 
Since Jones, the federal courts have deferred on several occasions to 
Congress‘s conclusion that certain types of conduct constitute badges or 
incidents of slavery. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,
309
 the Supreme Court held 
that Congress could rationally conclude that ―conspiratorial, racially 
discriminatory private action‖ that aims to deprive African Americans ―of 
the basic rights that the law secures to all free men‖ is a badge and 
incident of slavery.
310
 Likewise, in Runyon v. McCrary,
311
 the Court held 
that racial discrimination in contracts for private education could be 
understood as a badge and incident of slavery.
312
 The Court has, however, 
demonstrated the boundaries of the term, stating in City of Memphis v. 
 
 
 303. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Bradley had used the phrase ―badge of slavery‖ in his 
Cruikshank opinion. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 
18,497), aff’d on other grounds 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 304. Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 11. 
 305. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20–22; see also Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 3 (stating 
that the Court‘s decision in the Civil Rights Cases ―failed to give any independent significance [to the 
term ‗badges of slavery‘], and used it only as a ‗more colorful way of referring to the legal 
consequences of slavery‘‖).  
 306. Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 11. 
 307. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440–41. 
 308. See id. at 440. 
 309. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
 310. See id. at 105 (holding that Congress was within its power to create 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
(2006)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (creating a federal cause of action for damages for 
conspiracies to deprive any person ―of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws‖). 
 311. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 312. Id. at 173–75. 
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Greene
313
 that a city‘s decision to close a street did not impose a badge of 
slavery on black motorists, living in a nearby subdivision, who regularly 
used that road.
314
  
The most notable analysis from the lower federal courts regarding the 
meaning of ―badges and incidents of slavery‖ is found in United States v. 
Nelson,
315
 in which the Second Circuit upheld a Civil Rights Era anti-
intimidation law as valid Section 2 legislation. The statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 245(b)(2)(B), criminalizes the use of force motivated by animus against 
the victim‘s race, color, religion, or national origin, and by the victim‘s 
use of public facilities or programs.
316
 The court found that such violence 
had ―a long and intimate historical association with slavery and its cognate 
institutions.‖317 Moreover, after the Civil War, private violence continued 
and intensified, directed at African Americans who attempted to exercise 
civil rights in public places.
318
 Thus, the court concluded that Congress 
could rationally have determined that ―‗interfering with a person‘s use of a 
public [facility] because he is black is a badge of slavery.‘‖319 
In the growing body of Thirteenth Amendment literature, academics 
have asserted that many modern forms of oppression are badges and 
 
 
 313. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 314. See id. at 126. Notably, there was no congressional finding in this case to which the Court 
could defer. Rather, the Court was faced with the argument that Section 1 itself outlawed the badges 
and incidents of slavery. Rather than decide that issue, the Court simply stated that the city‘s decision 
did not constitute a badge or incident. See id. at 125–26. Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the 
street closing ―obviously damage[d] and stigmatize[d]‖ African Americans and therefore that it 
amounted to a ―badge or incident of slavery forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment.‖ Id. at 153, 154 
n.18. In Palmer v. Thompson, the Court did not resolve whether a city‘s decision to close its public 
swimming pools rather than desegregate them imposed a badge of slavery on African Americans. See 
403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971). 
 315. 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 316. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2006) (criminalizing the use of force to ―injur[e] . . . any 
person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been participating 
in or enjoying any [state or local government] benefit, service, privilege or program‖). 
 317. Nelson, 277 F.3d at 189 (citing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 30 (1977); 
Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619–1865: A Case Study of 
Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93, 95 (1985)) (noting that 
violence was central to the slave system and sanctioned by southern law in order to promote white 
supremacy). 
 318. See id. at 190 (citing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863–1877, at 119). 
 319. Id. (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984)). Nelson upheld 
the convictions of two African American men for stabbing an orthodox Jewish man on a city street 
because he was Jewish. See id. at 169–71. The Court determined that Section 1‘s ban on slavery 
applied to Jews, regardless of race. See id. at 179–80. The Court assumed that private violence aimed 
at Jewish people is a badge of slavery that Congress could target under Section 2. See id. at 190–91. 
For a cogent critique of the court‘s reasoning on this final point, see William M. Carter, Jr., Race, 
Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1311, 1360–61 (2007). 
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incidents of slavery and thus subject to federal regulation. These ―badges 
and incidents‖ relate in varying degrees to the legacy of slavery. Professor 
William Carter, Jr., has argued that any form of discrimination or 
subordination that was essential to the slave system or to postemancipation 
attempts at reenslavement is a badge or incident of slavery.
320
 Professor G. 
Sidney Buchanan has offered a much more expansive definition, claiming 
that ―any act motivated by arbitrary class prejudice‖ is a badge of 
slavery.
321
 Other authors have asserted that discrimination against 
women
322
 and gays,
323
 as well as restrictions on reproductive rights,
324
 are 
badges and incidents of slavery.
325
  
Thus, the concept of badges and incidents of slavery has a range of 
possible meanings. It could refer to the essential legal components of 
slavery,
326
 to a broader set of legal and social practices associated with 
slavery,
327
 or, most broadly, to any modern manifestation of bias and 
discrimination.
328
 It could be associated solely with discrimination against 
African Americans, with racial discrimination generally, or, most broadly, 
with discrimination against any oppressed class of people. Because Jones 
allows Congress to define, as well as legislate, regarding the badges and 
 
 
 320. See Carter, supra note 319, at 1367. Carter argues that race-based peremptory jury 
challenges, racial profiling, hate crimes, housing discrimination, inequality in the administration of 
criminal and civil justice, and systematic denial of equal education opportunities qualify as badges and 
incidents. See id. Generally, in Carter‘s view, the targets of a badge or incident of slavery are African 
Americans, although it is possible to conceive some forms of conduct that, by their nature, are so 
linked to the slave system—such as hate crimes and racial profiling—that they are badges and 
incidents of slavery, no matter who the target is. See id. at 1369–76; see also Amar, supra note 2, at 
158 (arguing that racist cross burnings are a badge and incident of slavery because ―if mere refusal to 
deal with another on the basis of race can constitute a badge of servitude, surely . . . the intentional 
trapping of a captive audience of blacks, in order to subject them to face-to-face degradation and 
dehumanization on the basis of their race,‖ also qualifies). 
 321. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Badge of Slavery Concept: A 
Projection of Congressional Power, in THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 175, 177 (1976). 
 322. See Sager, supra note 25, at 152–53; see also Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 
MINN. L. REV. 313, 349–62 (1977). 
 323. See Tedhams, supra note 24 (arguing that Colorado‘s Amendment 2, later struck down by the 
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), created a badge or incident of slavery because 
it placed gay people in a subordinate status). 
 324. See Bridgewater, supra note 24, at 410–15 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990). 
 325. One court has rejected the argument that discrimination against the disabled is a badge and 
incident of slavery. See Keithly v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 303CV0452L, 2003 WL 
22862798 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2003). 
 326. See Rutherglen, supra note 247, at 1393. 
 327. See Carter, supra note 319, at 1367. 
 328. See Buchanan, supra note 321, at 177. 
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incidents of slavery, subject only to minimal rationality review, the 
Section 2 power is arguably as narrow or broad as Congress chooses to 
make it. The next section explores the consequences of vesting this level 
of discretion in Congress. 
III. THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO CONGRESS‘S SECTION 2 POWER 
The trajectory of the Section 2 power—from its drafting, to its 
implementation by Congress, to its interpretation by the courts—suggests 
three possible ways to understand the scope of that power. This Part 
discusses each approach and evaluates it from the perspectives of 
constitutional text, history, and structure. Ultimately, I conclude that the 
appropriate approach to the Section 2 power requires a limited revision of 
Jones. Section 2 does allow Congress to legislate regarding the badges and 
incidents of slavery. However, the power is best understood as a 
prophylactic power, and the concept of the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery‖ is best understood as referring to a defined set of practices 
associated with slavery and postemancipation attempts at de facto 
reenslavement. Congress‘s discretion, accordingly, is limited to choosing 
which badges and incidents of slavery to target and how to target them. 
Jones‘s suggestion that Section 2 empowers Congress to define for itself 
the badges and incidents of slavery would create serious separation-of-
powers issues if taken to its logical limit.  
A. The Most Restrictive Approach 
One could argue that the question of Congress‘s power to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment is really quite simple: To date, the federal courts 
have articulated a very limited range of rights protected under Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. Specifically, courts have held that the 
Amendment is judicially enforceable only to remedy actual slavery and 
involuntary servitude, defined as the ―control by which the personal 
service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another‘s benefit.‖329 
 
 
 329. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); see also, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 
U.S. 931 (1988) (holding that ―involuntary servitude‖ prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment 
requires showing of physical force or restraint); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) 
(stating that the Thirteenth Amendment addresses only ―condition[s] of enforced compulsory service 
of one to another‖); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896) (stating that the Thirteenth 
Amendment invalidated ―involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as 
chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another‖); Sager, 
supra note 25, at 151 (―Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishes slavery, but the Court clearly 
does not think that Section 1 empowers the judiciary to police private acts of racial intolerance.‖); cf. 
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Therefore, Congress may enforce that right by passing legislation that 
would prevent, penalize, or remedy this conduct. Indeed, Congress has 
passed many such laws, prohibiting involuntary servitude,
330
 the slave 
trade,
331
 peonage,
332
 and forced labor,
333
 and banning related conduct such 
as kidnapping or removing official documents for the purpose of keeping a 
person in slavery, peonage, or involuntary servitude.
334
 However, in the 
name of enforcing the individual right to be free from coerced labor, 
Congress may not legislate on the badges and incidents of slavery, either 
as historically understood or as reconceptualized to reach modern-day 
forms of discrimination and bias. 
This text-based interpretive approach echoes one Justice Scalia recently 
offered in the Fourteenth Amendment context in Tennessee v. Lane.
335
 He 
looked to the 1860 edition of Noah Webster‘s American Dictionary of the 
English Language, which defined ―enforce‖ as: ―To put in execution; to 
cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws.‖336 Thus, he argued, the grant 
of enforcement power limits Congress purely to passing laws that 
―proscribe, prevent, or ‗remedy‘‖ conduct that independently violates the 
Constitution,
337
 and does not, as a general matter, permit Congress to enact 
―prophylactic legislation.‖338  
As a textual matter, Justice Scalia‘s argument fits the Thirteenth 
Amendment well. The language of Section 1 does not, on its face, invite 
 
 
Sterier v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that mandatory community 
service programs do not violate Thirteenth Amendment). On occasion, the Court has acknowledged 
the possibility that Section 1‘s self-executing right might be broader than its literal terms and extend to 
things like the badges and incidents of slavery, but has gone no further than noting and refusing to 
foreclose that possibility. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981) (noting that 
Congress‘s enforcement power ―is not inconsistent with the view that the Amendment has self-
executing force‖); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (―Whether or not the 
[Thirteenth] Amendment itself did any more than [abolish slavery] is a question not involved in this 
case.‖). But see Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―[B]y its own 
force, [the Thirteenth] Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges.‖). 
 330. See 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006). Other statutes also penalize enticement and kidnapping for the 
purpose of keeping a person in slavery or involuntary servitude, see id. § 1583, and prohibit the 
removal of official documents for the purpose of keeping a person in slavery, peonage or, involuntary 
servitude, see id. § 1592. 
 331. See id. §§ 1585–1588. The use of vessels in the slave trade is specifically prohibited as well. 
See id. § 1582. 
 332. See id. § 1581 (criminal provision); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006) (civil provision). 
 333. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006).  
 334. See id. §§ 1583, 1592. 
 335. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 336. Id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing J. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 484 (1860)) (―To put in force; to cause to be applied or executed; as, ‗To enforce a law.‘‖). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
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broad-ranging interpretation. Its proscription of slavery and involuntary 
servitude is precise, not ―vague and elastic,‖ as Justice Frankfurter once 
described the Constitution‘s ―[g]reat concepts‖ that were ―purposefully left 
to gather meaning from experience.‖339 Given the Court‘s limited 
interpretation of that language, Congress is left with the power to 
―proscribe, prevent, or ‗remedy‘‖ coerced labor. Nothing more, nothing 
less. 
This approach finds some support in the historical record. In the 
congressional ratification debates, two prominent supporters of the 
Amendment—Senators Trumbull and Henderson—stated that the only 
right conveyed by Section 1 was physical freedom.
340
 Even though Senator 
Trumbull also indicated that the Section 2 power would track 
McCulloch,
341
 this is not inconsistent with finding that the ―appropriate‖ 
substantive end toward which Congress can legislate is limited to the 
eradication of coerced labor. The state ratification debates also suggest a 
limited view of Congress‘s enforcement power. Recognizing the potential 
implications of Section 2, South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana issued 
reservations that Congress lacked power to legislate on the ―political 
status‖ or ―civil relations‖ of the former slaves.342 Just as the narrowest 
grounds offered in support of a court‘s judgment can form the court‘s 
holding,
343
 one could argue that these states‘ understanding of Section 2 
necessarily limits the scope of Congress‘s power.344 Indeed, as George 
Rutherglen has observed, ―the marginal votes necessary to obtain the two-
thirds majorities necessary in Congress [and in the legislatures of the 
 
 
 339. Nat‘l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). Frankfurter‘s examples of great constitutional concepts were the Commerce Clause and 
the Due Process Clause. 
 340. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1314 (1864) (Sen. Trumbull); see also id. at 1465 
(Sen. Henderson). 
 341. See id. at 553, 1313; see also supra text accompanying notes 165–66. 
 342. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 344. On the other hand, even though the votes of South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana were 
necessary for ratification in the sense that they triggered Secretary of State Seward‘s December 18 
ratification pronouncement, they were not ultimately necessary for the Amendment‘s ratification. By 
the end of January 1866, five other states (Oregon, California, Florida, Iowa, and New Jersey) had 
voted to ratify the Amendment without reservation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, reprinted in 
U.S.C.A. HISTORICAL NOTE, at LXVI (2006) (setting forth ratification information for Thirteenth 
Amendment). Four other states have voted to ratify as well: Texas, Delaware, Kentucky, and 
Mississippi. See id. (noting Mississippi‘s 1995 ratification of the Amendment). Florida, however, 
issued a reservation similar to South Carolina‘s. See EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 24–25 (1871). 
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ratifying states] were based on a severely limited view of congressional 
power to enforce the Amendment.‖345 
The limited view finds more support in the debates over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, when the Act‘s opponents uniformly argued that the 
Act exceeded the Section 2 power because it went beyond actual slavery 
and involuntary servitude. While this view did not prevail—the Act passed 
over these objections—the subsequent ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1870 reenactment of the Civil Rights Act gives 
credence to the comments of Senator Poland and Representative Raymond 
regarding residual doubt about Congress‘s power to pass the bill, even 
among those who voted for it in the first instance.
346
 
From a structural standpoint, restricting the permissible scope of 
Congress‘s enforcement efforts is appealing for its formalism and clarity. 
It respects federalism by limiting the extent to which federal legislation 
can displace the general state police power. Indeed, this was a major 
concern of opponents of both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. Furthermore, limiting Congress‘s enforcement efforts 
to purely nonsubstantive remedial measures has appeal as a formal 
separation-of-powers matter. Because Section 2 legislation would be 
limited to efforts to vindicate Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, this view is highly respectful of judicial 
supremacy. Moreover, it provides clear parameters for congressional 
action. 
Still, there are substantial drawbacks to this position. As a historical 
matter, this is not necessarily the best representation of the original 
meaning of the Section 2 power if one is willing to look beyond the 
ratification debates. The passage of the Civil Rights Act, however close, 
indicates that a broader view of Section 2 prevailed among members of 
Congress. As a structural matter, this position appears to limit Congress‘s 
power unnecessarily. The City of Boerne Court, which was clearly 
motivated by separation-of-powers concerns and a desire to preserve 
judicial supremacy, explicitly preserved a prophylactic role for Congress 
in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
347
 Thus, City of Boerne indicates 
that separation-of-powers principles do not demand a literal approach to 
enforcement legislation. Moreover, the restrictive view would be a major 
departure from precedent. Every Supreme Court case (save Hodges
348
) to 
 
 
 345. Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 8. 
 346. See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.  
 347. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997). 
 348. Hodges, of course, espoused the ―pure enforcement‖ view. However, Hodges was a notable 
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consider the Section 2 power accepts that Congress‘s power extends to 
legislation concerning the badges and incidents of slavery.
349
 Thus, the 
principle of stare decisis would counsel against the restrictive view.
350
 
The consequences of taking the restrictive view of Congress‘s Section 
2 power would be substantial in theory: Jones would be overruled and 
Hodges restored. Yet, in practice, the consequences would be fairly 
limited. A considerable amount of Section 2 legislation, including the 
Anti-Peonage Act and criminal prohibitions on slavery and involuntary 
servitude,
351
 is pure enforcement legislation and thus would remain intact. 
Moreover, much of the civil-rights-related legislation that Congress has 
passed under the Thirteenth Amendment—from the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 to the Fair Housing Act—likely would be sustained as appropriate 
legislation under the Commerce Clause.
352
  
B. The Broadest Approach 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the most generous approach to 
Congress‘s Section 2 enforcement power is that of Jones. By permitting 
Congress both to define and legislate regarding the badges and incidents of 
slavery, Jones arguably placed in Congress‘s hands the power to define 
 
 
departure and was overruled by Jones. 
 349. See supra Part II.B. 
 350. The principle of stare decisis has much clearer application in this context than it does with 
respect to the question of whether Jones should be modified or retained. Cf. infra note 391 (applying 
stare decisis analysis to Jones). Congress has repeatedly relied on the premise that Section 2 permits 
more than just remedial legislation. See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (describing 
statutes). Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 itself demonstrates that a more generous understanding 
of the Section 2 power was historically necessary for Congress to secure the Thirteenth Amendment‘s 
promise of freedom. See supra notes 182–86, 195, 200 and accompanying text (describing context and 
rationale of the Act). Although the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery deserves further 
exegesis, and the relative roles of Congress and the courts with respect to identifying the badges and 
incidents of slavery require further clarification, the basic idea that Section 2 empowers Congress to 
address the badges and incidents of slavery warrants continued respect. See Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (plurality opinion) (stating that the application of stare 
decisis depends on a rule‘s workability, reliance value, factual underpinnings, and doctrinal 
consistency). Even Justice Scalia has recognized an important role for stare decisis in evaluating the 
scope of Congress‘s enforcement power in matters pertaining to race. Although he would dispense 
with prophylactic legislation as a general matter, he has recognized that Congress generally has 
broader discretion to combat racial discrimination. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 351. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 352. The viability of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act would 
be a closer question. At the very least, the provisions on race-based crimes would have to be rewritten 
to mirror the act‘s provisions with respect to hate crimes based on gender and sexual orientation. Even 
with those revisions, however, it is not entirely clear whether the statute will withstand scrutiny; cf. 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
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the substantive reach of the Thirteenth Amendment itself. Because the 
concept of the badges and incidents of slavery is sufficiently ambiguous 
and its potential reach so broad, Congress could use its definitional power 
to ―expand the ends that could be achieved under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, moving from abolition of the narrowly defined incidents of 
slavery to prohibiting the badges of continued racial discrimination,‖ as 
well as discrimination on other bases.
353
 Thus, it is possible to read Jones 
as ceding both substantive and remedial power to Congress and opening 
the possibility that the Thirteenth Amendment will be treated as a source 
of general federal power to pass civil rights legislation. 
Read in this light, Jones is akin to Katzenbach v. Morgan, its 
Fourteenth Amendment counterpart from the Warren Court era.
354
 In 
Morgan, the Court suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
enforcement power would permit Congress to legislate based on its own 
assessment of the constitutionality of a particular practice, even if that 
assessment conflicted with the Court‘s. While the Morgan Court appeared 
to defer to Congress‘s substantive judgments as to the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,
355
 the Jones Court explicitly stated that Congress 
has the power to determine the full reach of the Thirteenth Amendment by 
defining for itself the badges and incidents of slavery. Further, just as 
Morgan was read as ―clear[ing] the way for a vast expansion of 
congressional legislation promoting human rights,‖356 Jones has been 
characterized as permitting legislation to protect ―against arbitrary 
infringement of fundamental rights.‖357 
Neither text nor history supports this broad reading of the Section 2 
power. While the appropriate subjects of enforcement legislation may 
extend more broadly than the ―restrictive‖ approach would allow, the 
concept of enforcement does not easily extend to reach efforts to define 
the substantive reach of the Amendment. Moreover, the historical record 
does not indicate that any of the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment 
contemplated, much less endorsed, such an expansive view of Congress‘s 
 
 
 353. Rutherglen, supra note 108, at 15. Moreover, if Congress may legislate regarding the badges 
and incidents of slavery under its power to ―enforce this article,‖ then ―this article‖—Section 1 of the 
Amendment—presumably protects a right to be free of the badges and incidents of slavery as well. See 
Carter, supra note 319, at 1349. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly refused to consider 
whether Section 1 ―itself did any more than [abolish slavery].‖ Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 
U.S. 409, 439 (1968); see also Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981). 
 354. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 355. See id. at 653–54. 
 356. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and 
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966). 
 357. TSESIS, supra note 27, at 86. 
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interpretive powers. Although the most prominent supporters of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 understood Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment as 
an affirmative grant of freedom and Section 2 as a source of power to 
secure freedom by abolishing the incidents of slavery, there was no 
suggestion that the badges and incidents of slavery had an open-ended 
meaning, much less that Congress had discretion to set that meaning. 
Rather, when the terms were used, they had definite content and referred 
to the core attributes of the historical practice of slavery and its immediate 
aftermath. Senator Harlan, for example, described the ―incidents‖ of 
slavery as including compulsory service, the inability to marry, 
interference with family relationships, the deprivation of education, the 
suppression of speech, the inability to acquire property, and the 
deprivation of any status in a court of law, either as a litigant or a 
witness.
358
 Senator Trumbull used both ―badges‖ and ―incidents‖ of 
slavery to refer to ―law[s] that denied civil rights to people on the basis of 
color.‖359  
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress used its discretion in 
the McCulloch and Prigg sense, namely, to choose which of the badges 
and incidents of slavery it would target and then to determine the means 
by which freedom would be ensured and the badges and incidents of 
slavery abolished. In other words, from the perspective of those who 
supported the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
Congress had remedial, but not substantive, discretion. 
From a structural standpoint, the propriety of the broad reading of the 
Section 2 power is debatable. It certainly creates serious separation-of-
powers concerns by fostering institutional tension between Congress and 
the courts and challenging the premise of judicial supremacy, an 
―indispensable feature of our constitutional system.‖360 Indeed, the Court 
 
 
 358. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1439 (1864) (Sen. Harlan) (listing ―[s]ome of the 
incidents of slavery‖). 
 359. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866). 
 360. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
617 n.7 (2000) (―[E]ver since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the 
constitutional text.‖); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962)) (noting the ―responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution‖). Although judicial supremacy is established doctrine, it has been subject to substantial 
criticism in academic circles. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (criticizing judicial supremacy as contrary to the 
original understanding that individual citizens should play a role giving content to specific 
constitutional principles); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 
84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (arguing that judicial modesty, in which court decisions align with popular 
opinion and the views of the other branches of government, promotes greater stability than judicial 
supremacy); infra note 369 (discussing departmentalism). But see Larry Alexander & Frederick 
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has taken care to guard its interpretive primacy in the specific context of 
congressional enforcement efforts. City of Boerne explicitly repudiated 
Morgan‘s suggestion that Congress could vindicate its own understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause in the exercise of its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers. The Court stated that this reading of 
Morgan would give Congress unlimited power and subject the 
Constitution to ―[s]hifting legislative majorities,‖ instead of treating it as 
―‗superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.‘‖361 The 
Court clarified that Congress‘s power to enforce the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle Congress to ―chang[e] what the 
right is‖362 or ―determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.‖363 
Thus, City of Boerne squarely rejected Congress‘s attempt to overrule the 
Court‘s earlier ruling in Smith, holding that the constitutional grant of 
enforcement power forbade such substantive efforts and permitted 
prophylactic legislation only to the extent that it was congruent and 
proportional to judicially declared rights violations.
364
 
The broad reading of the Section 2 power raises similar concerns, as it 
permits Congress to prohibit conduct that the Court itself might view as 
consistent with, or entirely outside the purview of, Section 1 of the 
Amendment. To be sure, the concept of the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery‖ does provide some nominal outer boundaries for congressional 
action. However, that concept is ambiguous and potentially expansive, and 
Congress could easily manipulate it to cover conduct far removed from the 
historical core of the slave system itself. Such a definition might well 
withstand the highly deferential rationality review mandated by Jones.
365
 
 
 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (defending 
judicial supremacy because authoritative interpretation provides stability and coordination); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013 (2004) (critiquing popular 
constitutionalism and praising judicial review for providing stability and protection against tyranny of 
the majority); Daniel Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (asserting that judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution are equivalent 
to federal common law and therefore binding). Whoever may have the better theoretical argument, 
City of Boerne clearly signals that, as a doctrinal matter, Congress must defer to the federal courts with 
respect to interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments. 
 361. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 362. Id. at 519. 
 363. Id.  
 364. Id. at 520, 532.  
 365. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); see also Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying rationality review); cf. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 
U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing highly deferential rational basis review 
because it virtually ―immunizes social and economic legislative classifications from judicial review‖). 
But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down local 
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Thus, having the ability to define the concept of the ―badges and incidents 
of slavery‖ could enable Congress to use its Section 2 power to ―chang[e] 
what the right is‖366 that is protected by the Thirteenth Amendment—
transforming it from a self-executing prohibition on coerced labor to a 
universal guarantee of civil rights. Accordingly, one would expect 
Congress‘s Section 2 power and Jones to be cabined in the same way that 
City of Boerne cabined Congress‘s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers. The two enforcement provisions are in pari materia,
367
 and the 
structural concerns that drove City of Boerne seem equally operative in the 
Thirteenth Amendment context.
368
 
Putting aside doctrinal consistency, however, one can argue that—
whatever the proper rule in the Fourteenth Amendment context—giving 
Congress broad substantive power is uniquely appropriate in the 
Thirteenth Amendment context.
369
 As Professor Larry Sager has theorized, 
 
 
zoning ordinance under rational basis scrutiny on the basis that it discriminated against the mentally 
retarded); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado state constitutional provision 
under rational basis scrutiny on the basis that it was motivated by animus against gays). 
 366. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 367. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004) (―on the same subject; relating to the 
same matter‖).  
 368. See Amar, supra note 25, at 822; Sager, supra note 25, at 152 (―Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment are structurally and formally parallel 
provisions, and the division of authority between the Court and Congress in one ought to hold in the 
other as well.‖); see also Caminker, supra note 25, at 1198 (noting that it is possible that ―the Court 
might be inclined . . . to let its new-found concern for means-ends rigor bleed over into any future 
constructions of the scope of executory Article I and other powers as well‖). Certainly, City of 
Boerne‘s rationale of wanting ―to protect the judiciary‘s actual or apparent interpretive supremacy 
concerning the scope of constitutional rights appl[ies] equally to support heightened constraints on 
congressional power across the board,‖ including in the Section 2 context. Id. The broad discretion 
given Congress in Jones raises similar red flags about the separation of powers and preservation of 
judicial supremacy. Id. 
 369. The willingness of the Jones (and Morgan) Court to entrust Congress with wide discretion in 
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment is, at a very basic level, consistent with the departmentalist 
emphasis on interpretive coordinacy. In contrast to the Court‘s own strong declarations of its 
interpretive supremacy, departmentalist scholars long have emphasized the interpretive competence of 
the legislative and executive branches. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 
TUL. L. REV. 979, 988 (1987) (rejecting the proposition that ―the Court‘s constitutional interpretations 
. . . mean[] the same as the Constitution itself‖); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 225–26 (1994) (same). Given the 
coequal and coordinate nature of the three branches of the federal government, they argue that each 
branch should have independent authority and responsibility for interpreting the Constitution ―within 
the spheres of their enumerated powers.‖ Id. at 218; see also Meese, supra, at 985–86; cf. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stating that no branch ―can 
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers‖); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 435–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (declaring that 
judicial review does not ―by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power‖). 
One could argue that Congress has the best institutional capacity to answer fact-specific questions 
about what conditions are badges or incidents of slavery. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 
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the judiciary underenforces certain constitutional norms out of concern 
about judicial restraint and deference to the decisions of elected 
officials.
370
 In such instances, Sager argues, it is appropriate for Congress 
to fill the gap between the judicial explication and the full conceptual 
reach of the constitutional provision.
371
 Moreover, courts should defer to 
congressional interpretive efforts in order to facilitate constitutional 
development.
372
  
The broad reading of the Section 2 power seems to fit well with 
Sager‘s underenforcement thesis.373 If the Thirteenth Amendment indeed 
is an affirmative guarantee of freedom, there is a substantial conceptual 
gulf between that promise and the Court‘s limited holdings regarding the 
scope of Section 1‘s self-executing right. Indeed, Jones explicitly left open 
the question of Section 1‘s independent reach;374 the Court has not 
foreclosed the possibility that the Section 1 right might extend beyond 
what the Court‘s current holdings would allow. Moreover, the Court‘s 
willingness to defer to Congress‘s definition of the badges and incidents of 
slavery indicates the Court‘s own acquiescence (imprimatur, even) in a 
scheme under which the two coordinate branches share substantive 
responsibility for bringing the Thirteenth Amendment‘s promise to 
fruition. The Court may well have determined that Congress is better 
situated as an institution to assess and respond to the legacy of slavery and 
the entrenchment of racial bias and violence.
375
 Indeed, by focusing 
 
 
185 n.20 (2002) (―the task of defining ‗badges and incidents‘ of servitude is by necessity . . . 
inherently legislative‖); see also Carter, supra note 319, at 1353–54; cf. United States v. Kozminski, 
487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988) (referring to ―the inherently legislative task of defining ‗involuntary 
servitude‘‖). 
 370. Sager, supra note 84, at 1216–18; see also McConnell, supra note 137, at 156 (―[W]hen 
Congress interprets the provisions of the Bill of Rights for purposes of carrying out its enforcement 
authority under Section Five, it is not bound by the institutional constraints that in many cases lead the 
courts to adopt a less intrusive interpretation from among the textually and historically plausible 
meanings of the clause in question.‖). 
 371. Sager, supra note 84, at 1239–40. 
 372. See id. at 1241–42. 
 373. Sager has stated that ―[t]he underenforcement model . . . explains . . . the disparity between 
the self-executing provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment and Congress‘s considerably more vast 
power under Section 2 of that Amendment to outlaw the ‗relics of slavery.‘‖ Lawrence G. Sager, 
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 
433 (1993); see also Sager, supra note 84, at 1219 n.21 (―[T]he great disparity between the scope of 
§ 1 and § 2 of the thirteenth amendment is that the court has confined its enforcement of the 
Amendment to a set of core conditions of slavery, but that the amendment itself reaches much further; 
in other words, the thirteenth amendment is judicially underenforced.‖). 
 374. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
 375. See Carter, supra note 319, at 1353–54 (noting that allowing Congress to define the badges 
and incidents of slavery permits for democratic consideration and public debate about the legacy of 
slavery and the appropriate approach to racial discrimination); Note, supra note 153, at 1302 (―As 
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Congress‘s efforts on the badges and incidents of slavery and reserving the 
power of judicial review, however deferential, the Court arguably set 
enforceable boundaries for Congress‘s actions while, at the same time, 
providing Congress with substantial interpretive leeway. Thus, Jones, 
broadly read, arguably lays the groundwork for an important and 
productive constitutional dialectic between coequal and coordinate federal 
branches. 
Still, this Sagerian account of the Section 2 power does not alleviate all 
the separation-of-powers concerns outlined above. First, the Amendment 
arguably is not underenforced at all. The ratification debates reveal that at 
least some supporters of the Amendment believed that its sole effect was 
the abolition of slavery and similar practices.
376
 From this point of view, 
the Court‘s decisions explicating the Section 1 right are coextensive with 
the theoretical scope of that right. If so, the Court in Jones ceded its power 
to Congress, and any substantive expansion by Congress will go beyond 
the actual meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Second, even if the Section 1 right is broader than the Court‘s current 
case law admits, it is not at all clear that the Court can validly enlist 
Congress as a partner in expanding the reach of Section 1. The Section 2 
power is clearly akin to the enforcement power as explained in McCulloch, 
which gives Congress wide discretion only as to the means by which 
constitutional ends will be enforced. In Jones, the Court essentially 
granted an aspect of the judicial power to Congress by giving Congress 
power to define the ends of the Thirteenth Amendment as well.  
With respect to federalism, most of the Court‘s post-Boerne decisions 
have confronted legislation in which Congress attempted to use its 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity.
377
 This context raises concern about safeguarding state 
sovereignty and protecting the public fisc. The Court has been protective 
of these interests and has crafted the congruence and proportionality test to 
ensure that prophylactic legislation stays within narrow bounds.  
 
 
modern perceptions of [the evils associated with slavery] grow, the response may take on an 
increasingly broader scope.‖); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kramer Incorrectly Decided? Some 
New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 485 n.183 (2007) (noting that Congress is better suited to 
determine ―what qualifies as a badge or incident or slavery‖ because that ―likely turns on highly fact-
sensitive considerations that are likely to change over time with shifts in communities‘ socioeconomic 
status and changes in cultural sensibilities‖). 
 376. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 377. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act). 
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This particular federalism concern doesn‘t present itself in the 
Thirteenth Amendment context,
378
 as Congress has not—at least to date—
used its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power to authorize suits 
against states. Rather, Thirteenth Amendment legislation generally targets 
private, individual action.
379
 However, legislation that controls private 
conduct raises a separate federalism concern, namely, that Congress could 
attempt to exercise such a high degree of control over private citizens that 
it will transform the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power into a 
general police power at the expense of the states.
380
 Indeed, at the time of 
ratification, one of the principal concerns voiced by the opponents of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and Section 2 in particular, was that it would 
destroy the federal-state balance and enable Congress to legislate on 
matters traditionally falling under the purview of the state‘s police 
powers.
381
  
It is certainly true that all of the Reconstruction Amendments 
intentionally altered the federal-state balance, and that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, in particular, has been the basis for displacing some state 
laws. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for example, negated the Black Codes. 
However, the worst fears of the Thirteenth Amendment‘s opponents have 
not come to fruition, as Congress has been relatively restrained in the 
legislation it has passed pursuant to Section 2. Still, the broad reading of 
the Section 2 power certainly raises concerns on the federalism front. If 
Congress has wide latitude to both define and legislate regarding the 
badges and incidents of slavery, there is a heightened risk that it will 
attempt to regulate conduct traditionally governed by the states. The broad 
reading, then, potentially fosters a situation in which the federal 
government could stray beyond its enumerated powers and encroach on 
traditional state functions. 
 
 
 378. Cf. Caminker, supra note 25, at 1198 (noting that the City of Boerne rationale of wanting ―to 
protect state sovereignty values by narrowing Congress‘ authority to regulate states qua states . . . [has] 
little direct implication for Congress‘ exercise of . . . Enforcement Clause authority to regulate private 
behavior‖). 
 379. See Rutherglen, supra note 247, at 1367. 
 380. Cf. Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40, 42 (2007) (discussing this concern in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context). 
 381. See supra notes 163, 169–80 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Middle Approach: Taking Prophylactic Legislation Seriously 
There is a ―middle approach‖ that takes a more limited view of the 
Section 2 power and of Jones than discussed in the previous section. 
Under this approach, Section 2 permits Congress to pass, not only 
legislation on slavery and involuntary servitude per se, but also 
prophylactic legislation to address the badges and incidents of slavery. 
Such prophylactic legislation is permissible because the badges and 
incidents of slavery arguably ―threaten to interfere with judicially 
recognized rights,‖382 and, thus, their prohibition is a means toward the 
end of preventing slavery and involuntary servitude. However, to 
constitute an adequate limitation on Congress‘s power, the ―badges and 
incidents of slavery‖ must be understood as a term of art with a finite 
range of meaning that is tied closely to the core aspects of the slave system 
and its aftermath.  
Thus, the middle approach would revise Jones by clarifying that 
Congress‘s discretion is limited to identifying which badges and incidents 
of slavery it will address—not defining them outright—and then 
determining how it will address them.
383
 While the judiciary will use 
McCulloch-style deference with respect to Congress‘s choices, it will 
actively review the ends to which Section 2 legislation is aimed to ensure 
that Congress does not encroach on the Court‘s role by substantively 
expanding the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery. This 
approach respects the proper role of the courts and Congress. It also 
maintains federalism by refusing to countenance efforts to use the 
Thirteenth Amendment as a source of federal power to enact wide-ranging 
civil rights protections unconnected to the legacy of slavery.  
 
 
 382. Massey, supra note 380, at 6. But see Carter, supra note 319, at 1349–50 (―it is not readily 
apparent that prohibiting the lingering effects of the system of African slavery is necessary to prevent 
or deter the reemergence of a system of ownership of human beings‖). 
 383. To my knowledge, nobody has suggested re-reading Jones and interpreting the Section 2 
power in this way, although this approach admittedly draws from the principles and concerns 
articulated by Justice Harlan in his Morgan dissent with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. Professor Amar once noted—in 
the context of critiquing City of Boerne—that the Thirteenth Amendment concept of the ―badges and 
incidents of slavery‖ identifies a desirable ―middle ground‖ where ―Congress has less than plenary and 
more than remedial power.‖ Amar, supra note 25, at 824. While I agree with this statement to the 
extent that it aligns with my view of Congress‘s prophylactic legislative power, see supra text 
accompanying note 382, I do not share Professor Amar‘s sense that Jones—with its grant of 
substantive definitional power and highly deferential standard of review—in fact cabins Congress‘s 
discretion in a meaningful way. See Amar, supra note 25, at 823–24.  
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The historical record contains considerable support for this view of the 
Section 2 power.
384
 Despite vocal opposition, the predominant 
understanding of the Section 2 power articulated in the 1866 debates was 
that it permitted a federal response to the southern Black Codes—state and 
local laws that sought to reinvigorate some of the incidents of slavery, 
including restrictions on the rights of African Americans to enter into 
contracts, convey property, and access local courts. Legislators viewed the 
Black Codes as incompatible with the Thirteenth Amendment‘s abolition 
of slavery (and, perhaps, its tacit promise of freedom), and conceived the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a means of cementing the demise of the slave 
system. As Representative James Wilson said, ―[a] man who enjoys the 
civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery.‖385 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus exemplifies the contours of the 
Section 2 power as originally understood. First, the substantive end toward 
which Congress may legislate includes the abolition of slavery and the 
prevention of its de facto reemergence. Second, to that end, Congress may 
provide federal protection against laws and practices that impose the 
badges and incidents of slavery. Such protection is prophylactic in the 
sense that it targets conduct beyond actual enslavement, but does so in 
order to cement the demise of slavery and to ensure a system in which all 
people can engage in the basic transactions of civil life, regardless of race.  
Third, there are limits as to how far Congress may legislate in this 
prophylactic sense. The appropriate targets for prophylactic legislation are 
the ―incidents to slavery‖ and the ―badges of servitude.‖ These concepts 
include (as Senators Trumbull and Harlan explained) race-based 
restrictions on contract and property rights and access to the courts, as well 
as legal impediments to education, free speech, and family integrity.
386
 
Although there may be additional ―incidents‖ and ―badges‖ of slavery that 
Congress can address, it is clear that these concepts do not refer to every 
legal deprivation or private act that disadvantages African Americans, 
much less other minority groups.
387
 For example, even the most ardent 
supporters of the Act denied that Congress would have the power to 
 
 
 384. This is true if one assumes that the debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are 
relevant to a proper understanding of the scope of the Section 2 power. See supra notes 241–45 and 
accompanying text. 
 385. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1118 (1866). 
 386. Id. at 322, 323; see also id. at 474, 1439–40.  
 387. Articulating a precise definition is beyond the scope of this piece, although George 
Rutherglen and Chip Carter have done interesting work on this issue. See supra Part II.C. My sense is 
that Carter‘s definition, see supra note 320 and accompanying text, is overinclusive to the extent that 
he is willing to include non-race-based discrimination in the concept. 
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displace antimiscegenation laws or extend voting rights to African 
Americans.
388
 In other words, the concept of the ―badges and incidents of 
slavery‖ has a finite, historically determined range of meaning. In passing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress did not invent the idea of the 
badges and incidents of slavery. Rather, it identified elements of 
preexisting concepts and crafted a legislative scheme to eradicate them.  
Fourth, McCulloch and Prigg, repeatedly invoked by the Act‘s 
sponsors, provide the proper framework for understanding the scope of 
Congress‘s discretion under Section 2. Those cases held that Congress 
enjoys wide discretion to determine the means by which to pursue 
constitutional ends.
389
 They did not suggest that Congress enjoys 
discretion to interpret the substantive provisions of the Constitution or 
determine proper ends. Thus, in the Thirteenth Amendment context, 
legislation must always be directed toward the eradication, prevention, and 
remedy of slavery and coerced labor. This goal is set by Section 1 of the 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Congress, however, has 
wide discretion to determine the manner in which it will achieve that goal. 
It may decide that legislation outlawing the practices at the core of the 
slave system and its aftermath—the badges and incidents of slavery—is a 
necessary prophylactic step, and it may decide which badges and incidents 
of slavery to address and how to address them. However, that prophylactic 
power does not permit Congress to expand the definition of the badges and 
incidents of slavery or engage in substantive interpretive efforts.  
Viewed in this light, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a remedial step 
within the discretion of Congress. The end of the law—preventing the de 
facto reemergence of slavery—was clearly within the meaning of Section 
1 of the Amendment. To that end, Congress decided to preempt laws and 
practices that sought to reimpose some of the incidents of slavery on the 
recently freed slaves. The laws and practices targeted by the Act—
deprivation of status to freely contract, convey property, and access the 
 
 
 388. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 202 (1865) (Rep. McBride) (―A recognition 
of natural rights is one thing, a grant of political franchises is quite another. We extend to all white 
men the protection of law when they land upon our shores. We grant them political rights when they 
comply with the conditions which those laws prescribe. If political rights must necessarily follow the 
possession of personal liberty, then all but male citizens in our country are slaves.‖). 
 389. See supra text accompanying notes 65–72. Of course, some are skeptical that McCulloch 
imposes any meaningful limits on the power of Congress. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1948–49 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (speech of James Madison) (―If implications . . . can be linked together, a 
chain may be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass 
of political economy.‖). But see J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 623 (2002) (arguing that McCulloch ―require[s] a relatively close 
proximity between a legislative measure and the enumerated powers of Congress‖). 
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courts—were undeniably historical incidents of the slave system. Thus, 
Congress‘s decision to target those specific practices, and to do so by 
creating federally enforceable rights and remedies, was a discretionary 
choice due great deference under McCulloch and Prigg. In other words, 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 evidences that Section 2 
empowers Congress to legislate as an act of remedial discretion, but not to 
engage in substantive constitutional interpretation. 
How, then, are the courts today to evaluate the propriety of modern-day 
Section 2 legislation? How are they to determine whether a law is truly 
prophylactic? The key appears to lie in the definition of the ―badges and 
incidents of slavery,‖ or at least the identification of the outer boundaries 
of this concept. Contrary to Jones, this ultimately is a task for the courts, 
not Congress. Congress, of course, may assert that a targeted practice is a 
badge or incident of slavery, and provide legislative findings that justify 
its conclusion. However, the first query in any Thirteenth Amendment 
challenge will be a rigorous assessment of whether, in fact, the conduct 
Congress has targeted falls within that definition. If it does, the next 
inquiry is the highly deferential question of whether Congress had a 
rational basis for the way in which it treated that particular badge or 
incident of slavery.
390
  
This ―middle‖ approach to the Section 2 power alleviates the structural 
constitutional concerns that have driven City of Boerne and its progeny. 
From a separation-of-powers standpoint, this approach respects the 
Supreme Court‘s role as the authoritative interpreter of the substantive 
promise of Section 1. Congress‘s role is to effectuate that promise by 
passing preventive, remedial, and even prophylactic legislation, not to 
engage in independent interpretive efforts. Just as City of Boerne 
recognized that prophylactic legislation is consistent with judicial 
supremacy, this ―middle‖ approach is also compatible with the premise of 
judicial supremacy. Allowing Congress to address the badges and 
incidents of slavery does not allow it to deny or undercut the Court‘s own 
 
 
 390. The congruence and proportionality standard utilized by the Court in the Fourteenth 
Amendment setting does not appear to be particularly useful in the Thirteenth Amendment context. In 
City of Boerne, the Court concluded that McCulloch deference was not envisioned by the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. But see supra note 119. The Court, therefore, devised the congruence and 
proportionality test to assess prophylactic legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The history of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, makes it clear that McCulloch and Prigg were 
meant to guide subsequent judicial efforts. The key for Thirteenth Amendment purposes, then, is to 
apply that deference in the proper setting, namely, with respect to Congress‘s legislative choices. The 
flaw of Jones is that it deprived the courts of a meaningful role in identifying which subjects are truly 
committed to Congress‘s discretion.  
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holdings that Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment eradicated slavery 
and prohibits coerced labor. Rather, understanding Section 2 to permit 
prophylactic legislation allows Congress to effectuate the promise of 
Section 1, as interpreted by the Court, by attacking the constituent 
elements of the historical system of slavery. 
The ―middle‖ approach to the Section 2 power also cabins the risks to 
federalism that the ―broad‖ approach raised. Of course, the Reconstruction 
Amendments effected a clear and intentional shift in the federal-state 
balance, securing federal power to displace certain oppressive and 
discriminatory state laws and practices. Indeed, the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
demonstrate Congress‘s power to target state laws and private practices 
that perpetuate the southern system of slavery. However, Section 2 does 
not give Congress power to target any law or practice it finds 
objectionable. By limiting the range of prophylactic measures Congress 
can take in the name of eliminating the badges and incidents of slavery, 
the ―middle‖ view ensures that Congress acts within its enumerated 
powers and does not unduly encroach on the general state police power. 
The ―middle‖ view is not without its own downsides and institutional 
costs. It maintains only elements of Jones and thus does not abide 
completely by the principle of stare decisis.
391
 Moreover, by reasserting its 
power to review the ends of Thirteenth Amendment legislation, the Court 
certainly runs the risk of antagonizing Congress. Despite these costs, 
however, this approach to the Section 2 power best accounts for the 
history, text, and structural consequences of the Amendment.  
 
 
 391. The factors governing the stare decisis analysis do not yield a clear answer with respect to 
whether Jones warrants reconsideration regarding its allocation of substantive definitional power to 
Congress. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (outlining four factors). On one hand, Jones has proven workable and capable of modern 
application, see id. at 854–55, as Congress continues to pass laws under its Section 2 power. See supra 
notes 49–55 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Section 2 legislation since Jones has been 
relatively rare, and it is hard to say that Jones is ―subject to a kind of reliance‖ that warrants special 
solicitude. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. Ultimately, the decisive factor is likely to be whether Jones—
or, at least, the portion of Jones that allows Congress to define the badges and incidents of slavery—is 
a ―remnant of abandoned doctrine.‖ Id. at 855. City of Boerne marks a clear jurisprudential shift on 
this issue away from the Warren-Court-era line of cases of which Jones is a part. See supra notes 137–
45 and accompanying text. The next few years are likely to reveal whether the Court is willing to 
extend the City of Boerne rule—or, at least, the structural principles underlying that decision—to the 
other Reconstruction Amendments‘ enforcement provisions. See supra notes 22, 146 (describing 
recent challenge to the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power). Given this mixed analysis, my 
proposal depends more on the merits of Jones, rather than the ―prudential and pragmatic 
considerations‖ related to stare decisis. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court decided Jones in 1968, courts and 
commentators alike have assumed that Congress has broad power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Under Jones, Congress not only can 
act to prevent and remedy the condition of coerced labor; it also can define 
and regulate the badges and incidents of slavery subject only to rational 
basis review in the courts. This latter aspect of the Jones conception of the 
Section 2 power is problematic. Giving Congress substantive power to 
define the badges and incidents of slavery is not consistent with the text or 
history of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover, as City of 
Boerne and its progeny make clear, there are real separation-of-powers 
and federalism concerns that arise from giving Congress such substantive 
power. Accordingly, this piece argues that the best reading of the Section 
2 power—from the perspectives of text, history, and structure—is one that 
allows for prophylactic legislation on the badges and incidents of slavery, 
but also regards that concept as having a determinate range of meaning 
over which courts can exercise meaningful supervision. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
